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KEY POINTS OF
.THEGRot'JPoFsEvENANDTHEEUROPEANCOMMUNITY.
*TheTokyoSummittekingplaceJulyT-gofferstheG-Ttheopportunityto.revitalizenotonly
their economies but also the reputation of the G-7. The main poins on the agenda are: l)
economic assistance tl- nurriu; )y ,igninl of a prerimioary  market access agreement in order to
pave the way for ttre-successful conclusiJn of tfte Uruguay Round by December  15' 1993; and
3) increased economic and monetary coordination  in order to spur their economies'
*  The $2g.4 biltion in G-T economic assistance predged to Russia at an emergency meeting
Apfil 14_15 has been designed to overggme the weaknesses in previous assistance  packages. The
G-7+l meeting, "f 
*ni.t president yeltsin will be present, will discuss ways to improve the
effectiveness  of tne assistance. Using .*p.ri.o.. guio.o nor previous aid packages, the G-7
now rearizes that *i*."  must be uisot" ano targited. The step-by-step approach  of this latest
package will alrow ,iJ ro be disbursed * 
"ronorii 
reforms rr. iorti.oming.  Requirements for
disbursement are more flexible since the strict conditionatity of earrier. packages  has been
reduced. rne critiJ $4.1 b'lion in the initiar support pu.lug. for sub'ization should be
disbursed  within the next 3-6 months'
*  The planned signing of -a-preliminary  mar!-et access agreement wrthin the realm of the
uruguay Round of n  ceTT negotiations will be the .ti.iut step in order to zuccessfully
conclude the rong-running Uruguay d;Jby  December 15, 1993. The 4-party Group has met
severar dmes in order to-reach *  .."oro in',n" rt rr of industrial  products and services'
* other obstacres to the conclusion of the Round exist including  national_ fiearment for services
as well as the issues of countervaifing  Outi*:-?"f p"tkt, inO textites'. The question of
establishing " 
*uttit.t ral trade org*rri ion (Mro) is another point stilr to be answered to the
satisfaction of ail contracting parties- while the EC views tne r*rro as being crucial to keep
the uR functioning,  the US is concerned  about the implementation of a powerfrrl new
international trade organization'
* peter sutherrand,  the o€w GATT Director, may be abre to reduce the existing obstacles by
reinvigoraring  tnr'ilouoo  though tris syieoiolgoti.,ign'. He has srared his belief that "the time
for platitudes ,uoui to  trade Fom tnJr.uoing indusnrial nations is over. " These members must
increase Oei, .oop"tation in order to enltance the strength of the global economy'
*  coordination of monetary policy with the objective of encouraging steadv erowth through
stable exchange rates has argrr,ably  been the primary porpo,tof ne d-ZlanC sfoiRcally the G-7
finance ministers and central ual* gou;.no., group 
'Thi, 
group has been moderately  successful
in achieving coordination  of monetary polity: Ct*t for their achievements is due to the high
level of communication  that ney areinvolved in. Recently they granteg the IMF the power to
play watchdog ou"i,rr" its memben'-r*.n*g.  rate poricier to "^*" 
that monetary crises are
avoided.
q* Stagnant economic conditions that have plagued the members of the G-7 since late 1990 are
predijed to continue throughout 1993. The IMF has pedicted a growth rate of only 2.2% for
i}gl. Persistently high unemployment  has become of greatest concern among the Group' While
the US will most ndly not impliment a stimulus program, both the EC and Japan have already
done so. Currently tire EC is focusing on increasing employment' The-V have approved the
ECU 35 billion Edinburgh Growth Inilative as well as an additional substantial  job-creating
initiative. The Copeiragen Summit will discuss ways to promote employment and
competitiveness. fapan tns implemented a $120 billion stimulus package which is based on
spurrirtg domestic demand-
*  I.he curent 
,de 
facto' position of the EC in the G-7 will need to be changed in the near
future. The Maastricht Tieaties, which contain the necessary legislation for economic and
political deepening of the Community, as well as the steps being taken to widen it through the
accession of states, will necessarily sUengthen  the EC. The strrt of Stage III in the process
towards Economic and Monetary ijoion iEftfUl will effectively change the G-7 into the G-4
where monetary matters are concerned. The increase  in the economic power that the EC already
possesses will make it an ever more formidable partner in the G-7 requirin g a 'de jure' position.
* The future of the G-7 must include increased levels of cooperation and coordination-  The
lack of follow-up concerning issues discussed at the economic zummits has caused their
credibility to be iow. Recently there have been calls for a revision in the G-7 process  and
particularly the summits. Originally  meant to be an opportunity for G-7 leaders to have close
-O oprn discussions on issues of common concefir, over the years the summits have rurned into
rrrri", publicity events. Changes to make the G-7 an effective and more viable forum for
discussion will be crucial in ordeifor them to meet the challenges that they will encounter  in the
funrre.
LExecutive SummarY
The upcomi ng G-7 Summit, to take place in Totvg 
7-9 July, will offer the leaders of the
7 largest industrial countries as well u, ,.pr"r.ntativei  from the EC the opportunity  to enhance
both the global economy as well u. G  tarnished image of th9 S-7.and G-7 process of
cooperation  and coordin.tion. The main points on the agenda will be: 1) economic  assistance
toRussia;2)thesigningofapreliminarymarket.accessaccordwhichwillopenthewayforthe
successful conclusion oFtn. un; ano 3) increased economic and rnonetary coordination  in order
to spur their econorio. This iummii t"pt*r"tr *::lt 
pint in the- history of the G-7' If
they rcize ne opps;"ity -o make significant progress in these areas' they will perhaps be able
to lgri" creoiuitity -d "u"n 
give new momentum to the G-7 process-
created in response to the economic crisis of the early i970s, the summit process has
ghenged dramaticatit ;;t  the ygan. Origrnally meanJ.to be a 'chat among friends' in order to
discuss coordination of econo.i. -Jr"onetary 
policies, the summits have become massive
publicity events. Unfornrnately,  as ttre strucgrl of the summits changed' their srbstance
zuffered. 'rfr" Irpu.t, *O iod""O .r"OiUitiry, of the. zummits is considered negligible'
while trre ".ti"iti"i'of 
the summit Seven cannor be assessed in a positive light, the year-
round process or cooperation and_coordination  in the economic and political spheres hes proven
to be moderatety  useirr. The G-7 assistance to Russia as weil as the G-7 implemented  but G-24
coordinated assistance  to central ano gasern Europe, have provided critical zupport to these
emerging reglons. Using knolledgg g"iorO aot p'&io* experiences' the G-7 and international
financial institutions have designed " 
pr.rr"g.rtn"t nrt every potential to provide "pragrnatic'
"itibl", 
tangible, and effective"  assistance to Russia'
In masers concerning trade-retateo ;;;,  and particularly the 94TT' 
the record of the G-7
h8s bcco scarred. Tbeir work ,o*oOt *mpf*id1 of both the Tokyo aod current Uruguay
Rounds has to date accomplished  little. However,  the receot progress in reaching a preliminary
market acc€ss agreement, which is pranneo to be signed at the Tokyo Summit, provides new
optimism for the reputation 9f.O9 
C^-Z'
The primary ,.1o" behind the formation of the G-7 was' and still is' the coordination of
monctarypolicy.SteadygrowththroughstableexcrrrTg:rateshasbeentheobjectiveoftheG-7
finance ministers and central bank gou!,no* goup. Although setbacks have been encountered'
they bave succeeded in achieving i  remadrabre  amount of 
-coordination- The role of the EC
withitr theG-Twillchangeprofoundt*no*ssrtof  stagelllof PMq -w-iththeEcgaining
the rigbt to ,.,p.o"oi tfre ttemuer 
-st"te.s in monetary i.tt"rr, the G-7 finance gp'p will
effectively be changed to the G-4'
Although not originally topics of the G-7, due to the interdependence. of economics and
poritics, the issues or"poridor coop"ration and security affairs have been discussed to an eve'r
g.at€f extent uy oe d-2. Among'the most effective atcomprishry"lts  in the-se areas have been
the declaration against terrorism, tle uissite Technology Cbntrol Regrme,- and their efforts to
extend tbe Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nucrear weapors. This year's Summit will also
continue to act as a lobby on the Bosnian issue'
The fuune of the G-7 will almost assureaty inctudc a revision of its current struch[e' Muty
who are ctosely involved with the G-,n;;"*,.*:f"Oiog President  Bill Ctinton' Prime Minister
John Major, and us Treasury s€cretaty Lloyd Bentsen, have called for changes to mske it a
more viable forum for discussion  and ac&oo. iO*tionally,  the'(efaa\'.membership  of the EC
will need to be upgraded in order to adjust to itt :Y-:t tttJogfttniog role in.international  affairs'
The participants oFo, G-7 must increase their abilities or-coo'peratiog and coordination- only
byworking.og'o"'.'p.'u,".'willtheybeabletoachieveprosperity.The way has been opened for a new partnership of shared responsibilities, not
only in Europ", *hi.h at long last is reunited, but also in the Asia-Pacific
,.gion and elsewhere in the world. we afe entering an era where
confrontation  has given way to cooperation-
This new partnership will take many forms. The former adversaries of East
and West witl cooperate extensively bn economic, political and security iszues'
-Excerpt from the Political
Declaration of the 18th Western
Fronomic Summit, JulY G8,
1992
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Thecurrentworldscenariocallsforanewagendain.which.cooperationand
coordination wilr be the crucial aspects.- in. croup of Seven (G-7)',.consisting  of the seven
economicdly  rargest ;dustrialized go*t i.l ;"t"n.l^\vl.T the ever increasing participation
of the European  community (Ec), h^ ,h" utrort potentiar to play the key role in carrying
out this agenda.
Behind the headline grabbingacdons of the past several months such as the $43 billion
assisrance package pledged to nussia,-tire";;;+ 9f 
structural reform' and the probable
implementation of u'rini time-tabre foJ"'.orpletion ol tn. uruguay Round' there exists
a firrrly estab[sned  process for coordination in economic  and increasingly  political and
securiry poricies. ihfii;ffion of c? ".l"i,ies 
are the annual summit meerings' During
wo days or inteosiu. Jr.urrioo, rhe neaos ofstate ::_g:u"*ent 
of the member countnes
as well as the representatives of the European g9ry:ni',y ttto*p*ied by their finance and
foreign ministers,  assess the economJ*IJp"h,ical situation, *d rrp out the routes for the
next year which are grgsented ,if;;'d"tlu"tions'  Howtu"t' for all their obvious
potential, the record oi th.r, *r*it-o,otiogs  has-been mixed' The biggest factor now at
,tate is a lack "f ;;J;iliry *ni.n tntli.^io undermine the summit process'
This year's G-7 Summit, rg be held in Tokyo on-i-g Jll{' *uo therefore grasp the
op,porrunities to inte*ify cooperatioo uoo coordinition that wilr be so crucial in expanding
the worrd ecooomy. These opportooiils have made trremsetves  visibte in the agreed upon
need to resist prJhJilrollo"i.,  *hich have been symptomatic  of the current econolruc
srowdown; in the oJ to solve continuing Jiur"..t dirpJ;G;tening the comptetion of the
uruguay Round;i,h. General Ad;il;;r-tr;  .,,d-rJe tcar'; and also in the
assistance package promisedby rc c?"Jiti *ni.t, n"s.Irt^:: g:i:,:n*t"  into the
international  ecooomy. with a.o*.rrJlnorrio  implement the aFeed upon points on
a new agenda ;;r,rk;;;;il"d"/,  ,""ti io, ,i. c-t *rtolt readers wi' not only
prove the crediblity of th. es: .rt:l #G;d:;;;'  tne poticies of coordination and
cooperation, but ,t'o n'p to crelte t 
"*fif 
-*ilgtotld 
economic  environment'
The objectives  of this surdy *fi.rrold: l) to q,o.ru,iruuy  review and evaluate lre
hisrory -o pr*J*Jo-Lniro tli c-i *-t-it meetings' 2) to eiamine -the 
more rouune
poricies of coordination in the oono,oi."Jrr*riri.'rp-h;;that 
form the basis for relations
between is parucipants, beins .-ifrti "i-,f, oot*d;;;:;": T:l--l 
facing' and 3) to-
present a case srudy of the Group oi-i.u.o', assisance'f,acugt  T R::11  example ot
successful *.  oiioop"otiog gd. *lroio"tion. edditiona'y, the uni.que oosition of the
European Community T q:'eigntnT"*oe.'of  the Gt;;;;is"ven w{lbe &scussed in the
context of is influeni. io ni, e*l*;;;ili-o*ru  rt io i" relations with the non-European
members. These aspects of the c-7;r;;  ;u,11f  oir"uttto with an eye oo the tutur. e
in order,o ort".rio, the potential f;-;  it"pr"ued recorJueginning with the 1993 Sumnut'
The Summits: Creation of the Summits
Recent summits have changed dramatically  both in style.*9 tub,ryte from the fust
few in the mid-r970s. rn strong ;"*;-l;;"  brigioJ rffiuh based on rather quiet utd
informal meetings, the past ,ru.t iilu[ i"tf"O"O t-f;;ilJ  schedule of preparation and
massive media coverage'  g of the originat Rambouillet  Summit
;;;r,,"fl'Jffi's#ff '*ffi ';".:,:i"ll-i'k;norevintsthJi"ft  th:i'ry::
ministers searching for solution,, -d in the absence ";-y 
potiti"t of coordination' acung-2-
individually in order to combat domestic problems.  First was the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system which had formalized the coordination of exchange rates since 1944. Next
came the irst oil crisis which quadrupled the price of oil in so many months. Following
these two shocks, the western economies plunged into recession and unemployment  soared.
The first step to replace the elements of economic coordination lost with the break-
down of the Bretton Woods system was taken by George Schultz, who at the time was the
U.S. Treasury  Secretary. Beginning late in 1973, he invited his counterparts  from the larger
western European countries, and soon after Japan as well, to a series of very private
meetings. These discussions, which ranged across many issues relevant to the international
political economy, became known as the Library Group meetings.
After becoming  president of France in 1974 Vatdry Giscard d'Estaing, an original
member of this group, began to press the idea of a meeting which would include the heads
of state or government of the largest western economies to be held in the same format as the
Library Group. As Robert Putnam, author of several books on the G-7 summit process puts
it, the purpose behind the plannsd first meeting came from the belief that "only heads of
govemment could rise above petty bureaucratic  concerns and overcome the increasing
fragmentation of international negotiation...[needed tol offset pressures for economic
nationalism. "t
The hrst meeting of what was to become an annual affair took place in Rambouillet,
France from the l5th to 17th of November, 1975. Gathered together were the heads of state
or government  from the United States, France, West Germany, &e United Kingdom, Italy,
and Japan (Canada and representatives of the European Community began paticipating in
1976 and 1977, reqectively). When meeting together for the annual meetings,  they are
collectively  referred to as the Summit  Seven (S-7). tn their own words, tbe leaders had "held
a searching and productive exchange of views on the woild economic  sinration, on economic
problems common to our countries"! and had met with the intention of increasing  cooperative
mea.sures in order to firnd solutions to these problems.
As the host of the Rambouillet  Summit, President Giscard d'Estaing had hoped to
keep the informal atmosphere of the Library Group meetings. However, even though the
next several zummits were relaxed in tone when compared to the later much more pre-staged
affairs, the feeling of being among close colleagues that had been so prevalent at the Library
Group discussions had disappeared.
Nevertheless, the fust summit can be considered  zuccessful  in that it helped to stabilize
the international monetary  system (problems concerning  exchange rate differences  between
the U.S. and France were solved) as well as established a process in which each member's
progress in economic and monetary coordination would be subject to an amual review at the
highest level- The Group of Seven zummits represent the first time that regularty scheduled
meetings of a trilateral nature involving  heads of state or goveflrment have occurred.
The Contents of the Summits
Critics of the G-7 summit process claim that it is "past its prime" and that the
meetings "suffer from a glut of glitter and a shortage of substance. "1 An examination of the
past 18 summits indeed shows varying degrees of success in implementing the policies
proclaimed in their declarations.  However, whether this is due more to a lack of true intent
or interest on the part of the leaders, to bureaucratic  systems which are adverse to shifu in
policy, or to extraneous elemenB remains to be determined.
A content analysis of past summit communiques reveals an amazing degree of-3-
consistency in zubject matter (see Appendix A fo,1 a. chronology of G-7 summit dates'
locarions,  and their;;;;;t 
"no 
a.tioot). Initially limited to economic and monetary issues
related to the 
"o"rry.'riris, 
beginning with the 1979 Tokyo Summit areas discussed  expanded
19 cover political developments  and -environmental 
concerns' Rapid response to newly
developing iszues can also be detected'
From lg75 - 1980 the zummis were concerned for the most part wjth the ongoing oil
crisis and the resurting need for cuts in consumption of oil as weil as frnding arternative
energy sources. nf tfr". 1979 summit, the S-7 wint so far as to set actual quantified levels
for oil imports. However, the oil conservation  measures adopted at the 1980 zummit were
to be more effective.
on ttl.e economic front continuous  refgrences  to reducing inflation and unemployment
were made. rn roo"t"ry mattefs the participants pledged to intervene in order to avoid
extreme fluctuations in exchange rates. io ,rrponr. to trrqsoviet invasion of Afghanistan and
the taking of u.S. dipromatic hostages in rrin tr  r9g0 summit issued political statements
condemning these acts of violence'
The zummit process encountered serious setbacks during the 1981 9ftty" 
Summit and
especia[y the 1gg2 versaittes Summit. Even though the S-7 recognized that their economies
now reguired growth, personal differences  in non-monetary  afeas diverted the attention of the
leaders and, therefore, little action was taken. The extent of the 'no-new-policy'  attitude that
prevailed in ottawa was best summed up by French president Mitterrand when he stated that
"not one rine" nad'Lln-.nang.o.r  'itr trr.oil over East-west trade that occurred at
Versailles geauy disrupted the congenial  atmosphere  of nast summits' Not only did the two
accords on trade and monetary matters that were ag(Xdon break down a few weels after the
summit, but there was even iear that the summit process itself would collapse'
The following tlree zummits stated as their objectives  the reduction of inflation,
futerest rates, and unemployment.  In order to combat the rise of protectioltt'  a new round
of GATT tatks was 
"igirt"O 
at the 1985 Bonn Summit. In the political declarations'
references were made to a Oesire to see the increase in dialogUe with the.$viet Union'
Action to imliove coordination among the Group of Seven, especiatly in the area of
muttilateral r*rt  ry surveillance, ,u* 
"ryhlized 
during the summits of 1986 - 1988' As
the 1986 Economic  Dectaration  states, tlibadem agreed to "form a nsw Group of Sevel
Finance Ministers...which  will worktog.tn t rot" clJsely and more ftequently  in the periods
between  the annual Summit meeting;s.'i Atth. 1987 Summit in Venice, they errcouraged this
new group 1p ioo*t" p"fity 
"ootii*tion 
and to work closely with the IMF' These ste'ps
to delegate the issue oi mon"t"ry coordination to their finarrce ministers and central bank
governors *rr, ,"k"o just in d;e.  They wotld eryb. the politicat l*9:* to turn their
attention to the o'pport*ities that would ti*  U" developing in Central and Eastern Europe'
Three oem[ werwhelmingly dominated the western  Economic  Summits from 1989-
l(, {,2: 1) the urgent need for economic sssistance packages in central and Easern Europe'
Zi Or complAio-n of the Uruguay Rouud, and 3) environmental ooncems'
At the l9g9 summit L prtir, the G-7 requested the Commission of the European
Communities  to coordinate assistance to Polatrd and Hungary. Thrc establishment of the
PHARE program *O 
"*pr*ion.of 
G-Z assistance to odrcr reforming Central and Eastern
countries *r, .ot*odrtr ,t the 1990 Houston Summit. Concerning  assista'ce to the
(former) Soviet Union, the leaders approved.the  proposal of a snrdyto determine how best
to support oogoiog;il*. Reflecting the importance the G-7 atributed to th€ changes
occurring in the 1io..etl Soviet Unioi, in tggt Soviet hesident Gorbachev  and n 19Dl2
Russian president yeltsin were invited to atrend special sessions of the summits. However'-4-
neitherreceivedanysubstantialofferofeconomicassistance.
Beginningwiththelg8gsummit,theG-Tstatedtheircommitmenttooriginally
p'rogress and then to actually complete ttre'Uruguay Roynd in each of the next four economic
declarations.  A successful conclusion to the fudt tu|kt was foreseen by the end of 1990'
1991, and lgg2. rn trr. rggr economic declaration, the leaders went so far as to pledge that
they would "each r;;;p.^onatly involved in this process' ready to intervene with one
another if differenc;; onty be resolved at the highest level-"'
"The first gron rur-it' was how The Econimist described the 1989 Paris Summit'6
tndeed, eighteen points were dedicated  to the topic of the environment  emphasizing the urgent
need for international cooperation- Taking pl"tt toon after the Rio Conference on the
Environment ,tle tgg2t"tunicn summit norco ihe importance of the event and called on non-
G-7 countrio ,o n rp in o,i*y"g trre climate change convention by the end of 1993'
The Impact of the Summits
Ashasalreadybeennoted,andisfurtherself-evidentafteracomparisonofstated
intentions and acUral accomplishments, the impact of Western Economic Summits has been
negligible. To describe the past summits would seem to require a $rn on an old adage:
"words, not deeds.' As a rezult of the lack of concrete meas'res  that have come out of these
annual gatherings, and too little fotlow-up  on those-that have been made, matry view them
as having lost their or"oti"r ingredient. to. ro"ot princeton University study that assessed
the zummit decrarations from r975-r9gt, the authors write: "Arthough the verdict differs
somewhat  by summit and issue, we conclude that the credibility of zummit undertakings must
generally be rated low-"e
Inherent limitations exist. The s-7 gather for a trvo{ay meetine^with an agenda that
arows fio1e oppornrnity for free and open oiscussion.  The participans  of the original Library
Group, as well as the heads of state or goverilneol  lhat 
met at the first few summits' were
able to gain,aro.n.* p".rooa underitanding of the domestic p-ressures their counterparts
faced, fuerefore making mutgal decisions more realistic and workable'
External factors also play a part in limiting the effectiveness of stated oUjectiyl' 
- f9r
example, the time and resources conzumed Uy dt 1991 Gulf Wr as well as the 1992 U'S'
presidential o.p.igo and the EC Maastritni tt 
"ty 
referendums most likely diverted the
majority of participants from placing the necessary emphasis on the completion of the
Uruguay Round-
However, the purpose of the S-7 meetingt tho{g not be judged-solely  by th9 tannb}e
res'rts nor shourd the declarations  be the meairre of their *ri.ts. They are still the only
oppor$nity for the leaders of the major sevsn idustrialized countries and the representatives
of the Ec to gaoer face-to-face and discuss topical eco_nomic and political issues conunon to
all. The summits also serve as an imporant deadline for the completion of policy progran$
involving the ParticiPana.
pug6m and'nayne note that the S-7 see their role not so much to negotiate and
implement detailed policies as o provide an overall stratery for their countries to pursue'
ml.i.*orplish  ttis in three principle rnanners: '1) endorsing general principles ""'
iifiro^oti"i individual commitirents by summit garticrgants ..., &d 3) glving impulses to
wider negotiations io o,tq bodies."ro if on *"igttt ttte impa"t of the summits by these
m.atotet, their record is somewhat improved'-5-
The positive impact that the S-7 meetings have had may best be stated in their own
words: ,we ... believe that the economic summits have strengthened the ties of solidarity'
both potiticar and econo,ni., that exist betrveen our countries and that thereby they have
herped to zustain nL uru", of democracy that underlie our economic and poritical
systems. "tt
The Process of PreParation
Given that the western Economic summits are the annual culmination of Group of
Seven activity, a glimpse into the process that leads up to these meetings is crucial to
understand both the format and content of the summib as well as to see where the potential
for increased cooperation and impact lie'
In terms of organization, the summits are gfouped into seven-year cycles with the
location of the -o*iir*iogs oeterrrineo by an 
"st"u-tirt 
eo schedure (i.e., France, UK, US,
etc.). The host country assumes the chairmanship of that year's summit and is responsible
for the events that accompany the meetings'
Beginning ;;ffti  the t\6su-mmit, the preparatory process kame increasingly
more intense and instit'tio nalizl/,. curr"ouy iris a y."t rong pto"* involving hundreds of
people (some nrU-time), matry meetings boti national-and  collective, and hours of patience-
testing negotiations.  artnouih the "itformula 
differs somewhat by country, there exist
several identical elemelts .t-*"tt as substantial forums for coordination'
Thekey."tn.-p.*"'sarethepersonalrepresentatives,knownas'shgrpas'.Atooe
time personall' ,t oilrr'Ut 
"; 
neads of state or governmenf recently the duty has come with
a certain job titre. 
-to 
t6 case of the presidenl of the commission of the Ec, tlrc chcf dtt
cabinetis assigaed the responsibility. For the rnajority of the other participants (including
the US and uK), the highest economic affairs oin.iif in the foreign ninistry will be-the
sherpa. These people, who are t""iot p"ucy-makers.with  open and direct access to their
respective  head of state or government,'rt  i"rponsible for the entire process of preparing
their state,s rgenda "nJ"*r?i*tiog 
it with thosl of the other members- with the increasing
complexity of the process over the -yo*, 
it was necessary for each state to srbstantially
expand the original format to include several 'deputy sherpas' a1 well as a thee-member
zummit ,task-force, made up of re,presenatives from the executive department and the foreign
and finance ministries. Additionally,  ruost state agencies that desl with slmmit topics are
also involved through participation 6n special commiftees-tr
The role of the relevant internationat organizations in the zunnit pre'parations must
atso be noted. rn *r-it  process has been oacribed as 'exerting a gravitational pull on
all international  discussions involving the IMF, the organization for Economic cooperation
and Deveropmetrt ioEaD), the GATT, as well as bilateral and multilateral contacts amoog
the zummit countries.t3
The extent oi,frir pull can be cleady wrtnessed  by the recent increase in th€ level of
activity at the uilatJ 6fiay 7th us-Ec rioika meeting), multilaterar (May 14th and June
2nd Four-Party  Group meeting betrveen  the uS, EC, Japan, and canada, with one additional
meeting schedured before the ,G_-? zummit), and intirnationar  organization (April 28th
IMFA*TB  meeting witn tl, G-l0'financ. rioirt .r, and the June 2-3 OECD meeting) levels'
Focusing prinarily on topics to be discussed  at the upcoming Tokyo Summit,  ttre results of
these meetings nefp Oefiie the agenOa as well as the probabie outcome of the summits'
The summis themselves have become wetl-rehearsed and neatty packaged publictty
affairs, albeit with the approval of the leaders. The inrportance given to the media at the-6-
summits is reflected in the work of each participant's official spokesperson' The job of this
person is to whip up support for their goue.nment's  position and to coordinate all coverage
of the event.
As may be assumed from the preceding brief description of the preparation involved
in the annual summits, the process allows tittle room for spontaneous propositions on behalf
of the leaders during tfreit time together- Future summits and their impact could be made
more substantial  by a reform in the summit process. There has been a growing amount of
self_doubt among recent participants. while they agree that the networking that takes place
at the meetings is t"ry i.pott-t, substance has been lacking' Reform rn the shape of a
scaling-down  of pro..Ooral protocol in order to increase the effectiveness  of the summits may
occur as early as the 1994 summit in ttaly'
The European CommunitY in the G-7
The important role that the EC currently plays within the entire G-7 framework
reflects its growth in influence and its legitimacy  to speak with one voice' lndeed, the
success of the single market and continuous progress towards 'an ever closer trnion' in the
spheres of econoiic, monetary, and political activity set gd  examples of the merits of
cooperation  and coord.ination which the exiSence of the G-7 is premised on' However, the
EC was not invited to the S-7 meetings until 1977, andeven then encotmtered discrimination
in its participation for matry yeas. - 
f'oUowing the 1975-f&-Uouittet Summit, the EC as well as the individual  member
states voiced their indignation over being excluded from this new forum for multilateral
discussion.  The smaller states feared ttutthey would become second-class members  and lose
the streogthened voice they had gained within the EC. The Community, believing that the
zurrmit f,to""5 would Oimlnisn its role, was able to base their complaint on a legal
*.pon"ot. The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which estrblished  the European Communities, grarits
the EC the sole right to qp"rk for its members on certain economic issues, including
international r.O. .iO anti-protectionist measures.  Since the four European members of tlp
G-7 represented themselveJin  all economic and pottical arqm at the zummits, they were in
violation of the treaty.
fhe European Parliament, who was by far the most active proponent of EC
participation  amoog the Community institutions, initiated debate on the zubject almost
immeiiatety after tle first zummit. In March 1977, the Euopean Padiament  presented  a
resolution,  fully backed by the Commission, that demanded the presence of representatives
of the EC from the Council and the Commission at the L,ondon Summit. The European
Council meeting immediately prior to the summit encountered  new pressures from some of
the smaller states but evennrally ageed that the presidents of the Commission and Council
should asend the pars of the summit where the EC had competence.  Final approval for this
procedure was made later that year.
Even thoug! the non-European members of the G-7 never opposed the participation
of the EC, disgruntled voices on the extent of their activity, especially in the case of political
iszues, continued  to be heard from some of the European members. It was only at the
seventh summit held in Ottawa iir t98t, that the representatives of the EC gained access to
the potitical discussions.
While there were still some administrative  difficulties which followed (i.e-, not
enougb chairs at the meetings and confusion on who to invite), the EC haq become a full
parti&pant in the G-7 and S-7 process. The EC represents  the countries of the EC which are-7 -
not members of the G-7 and at the same time attempts to coordinate their views with the four
member states which are full participants. Although the EC does not bring a formal mandate
to the summit meetings, it is attempted  to p'""niu' coherent a package as the views of all
member states allow. This is 
"n.o*ugrd-tf'ougtr 
discussions  at the European Summit which
takes place immediately prior to ttre westJrn Summit' working groups within the
commission draw up the institution's econotic and political declarations' After the summit'
the commission will report the results to the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER).  When the iummit is hosted by a European member of the G-7 who at the same
time holds the EC froiO.o.y, only tne presiOent ;f the Commission  accompanied by the
commissioners  responsible for.*r"*"1 economic and political affairs will be in attendance'
In the case of either a non-European member or a European  member not holding the
presidency cnairing Oe summit, thi prime minister of the EC country currently holding the
presidency will also be invited.
ParticipationbytheECintheGroupofSevenhasresultedinthreeprincipleeffecs
as summarizndby Bonvicini and Wessels:
l) the regular meetings of the western summits 'forced' all community
countries to elaborate some .otn*oo gUidelines for international economic
policies, ...
2) have strengthened  the defactorole of the Commission  by actively involving
it internally ii tne Community pre,parations  and externally in the discussions
and bargaining process of summitry iself' "'
The irnpact of the EC on the activities of the G-7 has grown paratlel to the increasing
influence tne commu;tG gained in worrd affain. prost visiud nas been the successful
coordinatio n of G-24 aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe'
with 56.8% of Danish citizens voting to accept the Maastricht Treaties on 18 May,
the future of the eu.p.ro community has Gn given new life, with onry ratification by the
united Kingdom remaining to decide its fate. rtr .tti.to of the Treaties provide for closer
cooperation in economic, moneoty, -opolitical 
areas in order togo{::::to -  eventual
Europea.n Union. However, .u"n 
"t 
its current stage the European Community has become
a member of equal-footing in n" ttifti"J rehiorship forming the basfs of the G-7'
Especially in the economic sectof, tfrg eC has long played an irnporAnt role in global mde'
(See Appendix B for Community trade *,ioitt *iprti"g the EC, I{S,. and Japan)' As the
community has grown in staturl, it nas atso sought io ittiease its relations with the united
States andiapan to create a closer parurership
The United States and the il;p*i  community  have_always enjoy{ -1 
special
rerationship. on the issue of further european integntion, ttte us has shown its full support-8-
of Community  progress towards fficrive integration. In 1989, with visible action towards
the successful completion of the Single European Market pointing to intensified EC/US
relations, the first moves towards a mote formalized relationship were made by then President
Bush and US Secretary of State Baker during two separate speeches . On 23 November  1990,
after rounds of discussion on both sides, the US and EC signed the Transatlantic Declaration.
This agreement provides for regular bi-annual discussions  between the presidents of the US,
EC Council and Commission  as well as a whole host of meetings at the ministerial level.
Stated within the Declaration are pledges to consult each other on important issues common
to both in order to bring their positions closer to one another as well as to pursue increased
coordination on economic and trade issues and in assistance to Central and Eastern Europe.
According to an official at the US Mission to the EC in Brussels, the funne agenda
of EC/US cooperation includes increased emphasis on regional and Third World development,
as well as in iszues involving the environment. As concerns future EC/US formal
imtitutional relations,  the official noted that the Transatlantic Declaration  is not considered
the end point and that the US views bilateral relations between the two as being governed by
the state of the EC.'5
While the Transatlantic Declaration has up to now been carried out to the letter, there
now seems to be a desire on both sides to promote the spirit of the document. In a recent
development  late this past April Denmark,  who holds the EC presidency until the end of
June, announced its goals for achieving stronger economic and political ties with the US.
Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen stated that "We s€e new opportunities in our
relations with the US. It's necessary ,o .svitalize the world economy. The EC, United
States, and Japan have a vital role in this respect."'6 Echoing the same thoughts, following
his May 7th meeting with Commission President Jacques Delors, President Clinton
emphasized that the US considers the EC a partner in global affairs and said that this
perspective "guides this administration". "
Relations with Japan have also become closer in recent years. The Joint Declaration
signed between the EC and Japan in July 1991 was the real starting point of formal relations
between the two. According  to an official at the Japanese Mission to the EC, the declaration,
which is similar to the Transatlantic Declaration in content, signalled the readiness of both
to become global partners. Japan wished to strengthen the third leg of the triangular
relationship that exists between the US, EC, and Japan. The Joint Declaration is based on
the concept of -sound competition and constnrctive cooperation."'t Although currently
relations between the two have been focused on trade issues, it is expected that overall
relations will continue to build gradually. The EC and Japan currently have cooperation
projects in areas concerning among others the environment, science and techrtology, energy,
and culture.
Fconomic  Overview Among the G-7
In order to better understand the framework in which the individual G-7 members
must operate as well as attempt to cooperate, the current economic sihration and
irccompanying domestic pressures  each is facing must be outlined.
The hopes for an economic recovery that was to be led by the United Sates in 1993
have been tempered by the unexpectedly  sharp drop in its growth figures from 4.7% in the
4th quarter of 1992 to only 1.8% n the fust quarter of this year. Stagnant  economic
conditions that have plagued the members of the G-7 since late 1990 are predicted to condnue
throughout 1993 (see Appendix C for selected economic indicators). The International-9-
MonetaryFund(IMF)recentlyreducedirspredictionforthisyear'sglobaleconomicgrowth
rate from 3.6% to onlY 2'2%
The Individual Situations
President clinton has called on Europe and Japan to become partners in growth to help
stimurate t'e grobar economy. How-ever, these areas are suffering from their own deep
economic probrem. A;,h; #eting of G-?'finance  ministers and centrar bank governors that
took place late in April, German..Finance Minister Theo waigle stated that Germany's
recession was "deepeinan  expected" and that recovery would take longer than was originally
predicted.,o Adding to the gloom emanating  from Germany,  Bundesbank  President Helmut
Schlesinger', ,.trik, that the recent 'ttif 
iuts in the German interest rate would not likely
continue beyond trr. .urrn t 7 -2s% was sure to have caused disappointment among the
gathered officials. e*cept for. the united Kingdom, which is showing some signs of
beginning is climb out of.recession,  the other members of the European  community appear
to be caught in a deepening.recession. The average growth ottin the EC' predicted in
March this year ro U"'O.SZJi^ 1993 was revised in May 19 be 0'0% as comparedto l'l%
n 1992.  r , ^*j^.-.aao Lonn.,Air  is "suffering its
Japanisalsoundergoing-domesticwoes.Accordingtoooereport,lt
most worrying economic Jowdown since the second worti war."' lts current trade surplus
has become a pomt of contentioo ,t*l  tn' oth3r members of the G-7' The rate of growth
for lgg3 h^ b*" ;;;Ji;b"  only"l %, a de,cTease of 0.5% from 1992'
Persistently  high unemployment, due to the strains is places on both sociery and
govemment UuOgerslf;r,  Uootg tt, gr."t rt concertr 1*"t 
the Group'- -Figures 
fot 1992
are as follows: EC - 9.4To; us - l.Vi"; lrpan - 2.17;; aid canada - .tt'zn' 
The 1993
Annual Economic  Repon of tlu ni'oi'*  Comruntty states ttral thl"nredicted  1993
unemploymeot rarc i;; ,h" gC of fl,o tmllbe at a levi not seen since 1985 and that the
"gains made during thelast.five years "rur. 
past decade w'r have been rost again in the first
three years of the-1gg0,s."'  tn-a recentituiy byrhe Euroryln rylT:T' 
it is estimated
that in order to prevent the rise in unernploy..nith.r. must be economic growth of at least
z'%.n This would indicate u .ontlnu.i rise in unemployment for all G-7 participants'
Threc Similar ResPonses
In order to break the downward qpiral of recession and unemployment  as well as the
accompanying oan"g"[J;;il,  io .Jo*rrr and industrial confidence,  the European
community, u.s., and Japan have each developed  economic stimulus packages'
At tast December,s  European coun it reetiog (trre twice yearly summit of Ec heads
ofstateandgovernment),apactagekog*.''.f:.MinburghGrowthlnitiativewils
presented.  This plan, which **.ppiouJUy the EC finance M'inisters April 19' 1993 and
is to be imptemented  later this y*,_ inuotu,, panicipatign at both the national and
community levels-- 
-valued 
at EcLi 35 biuion it is I suppiy-side package which focuses on
increases in pubtic and private investment, additionat ,rii"dn." for small-and-medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), job training-progo*r, Pd 
places, an additionat emphasis on market-
oriented wages .J Jt*r*r* rJrorrni in order to create a more competitive environment'
currently,  the commission  of the t"-p*  communityis pt pttiog un additional substantial
job-creating ioitiati"" io t. io.tuded inthe overall gfowO package framework' However m
a recent address to members of the *."p"r" parliament,'pririirnt Delors stated his belief_ t0-
that economic growth by itself will not lead to a sufficient <lecrease in unemployment- A
complete restructuring of eutope's employment  structure is needed to not only increase
employment but also competitiveness  with the US and Japan'
The Clinton edministration  announced both a five year 'New Directions' economic
plan as well as an economic stimulus package.  Stating that it was a "long-term  economic
pl-, no short-term  miracles, "a President Clinton rapidly received Congressional approval
'for 
his budget bur is still attempting to get his entire plan approved. The plan, which focuses
on investing in the future of ttre United States, places emphasis on job training, education,
and improviment to existing infrastructure. A major point is that it includes reducing  the
often criticizrt fe71e131l budget deficit by $500 billion over a five year period through  a
combination of spending cus and tax increases. More controversial  was his $16-3 billion
economic stimulus pu"k"ge.  Designed  to quickly create new jobs through such means as
pubLic works initiatives und rur^er youth jobs, it was halted in the U.S. Senate- Many
doubted the need fior such a stimulus. President Clinton offered a scaled back $12-2 billion
package which is currently being snrdied by Congress, but is not expected to receive
approval.
Japan has recently added to its first stimulus package which was announced  last
Aurumn for a combined  flrcal injection of 13.2 trillion yen ($120 billion). This new stimulus
package is based on spurring domestic demand  instead of increasing exports. The OECD has
preOicieO  that theJapanese 
"cono-y 
will recover before 1994. Nevertheless,  both the United
states and the lMFbelieve  that Japan must still take further action in order to decrease a
trade surplus rhat grew 26.27o from 1991 to 1992 and is estimated to reach $160 billion this
year.
However, the key to improving the economies  of not just the participants of G-7 , but
indeed the entire global @onomy, is the zuccessful  conclusion of the Uruguay Round- Most
people involved would agree with the feelings of President Clinton that the "round has
dragged on entirely too long."z It is estimated  that orrce it is in operation, the Uruguay
noun{ could bringabout an increase of $5 trillion in world output over the next l0 years.r
Therefore, ttre CAff directed program is by far the most crucial economic stimulus package
that can be implemented.
Cooperation  and Coordination  Among thc G-7
The growth of interaction  benveen the EC, US, and Japan on a bilateral level has
created a tripartite relationship in which each participant is approximately equal. Parallel to
this increasing globalization is the growing trend towards regionalization as seen in the
emergence ofthe EC/EFTA into a European Economic Area (EEA), the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFfA), and the rapidly forming economic region in Southeast
Asia. The heightened form of interdependence that exists between both the larger players as
well as smallir players on this expanding playing field has increased the pressure for
convergence. In order for these regional trading blocs not to resort to protectionist  measures,
it is crucial that they develop within the framework of existing global 'rules of play'.r
Cooperation  and coordination will play ever more important roles. As witnessed in
the past, independent action on the part of the EC, US, and Japan will lead to each being
worse off. The same will hold true for the regions zurrounding  them. The G-7 has the thost
potential to implement programs of cooperation.  It need only take the initiative.
However, even with the advantages of cooperation so clearly visible, barriers to
increasing cooperation exist. States face domestic pressures which often force them to take- ll  -
sh<lrt-sighted actions in order to appease certain national elements' The issue of burden
sharing, or the 
"quut 
tlistribution of tn. costs and benefrts related to cooperative action' is
also a limiting factor. A related component  is simply a lack of trust' while economic  and
political cooperation,  leading to among other things u ftt" and open market' is indeed a win-
win situation, the Oii".*ttissociated with classic game theory exist' The difficulties that
the uruguay nouno-nas encountered show the resulti of a rack of cooperation or a 'me-first'
attitude.
Fortunatelythereexistnumerousforaforcooperationandcoordinationinareas
concerning international  economi., *on"ory, andpoliticar  activities  (See Appendix D for a
rist of selected  IGOs and NGos, their members andobjectives). Related to economic issues,
the G_7 Finance Ministers and central Bank Governors meet two or three times per year in
order to discuss and promote convergence of economic performance among members' The
G-5 and G-10 tu;f,on in a similar yet more private. *ul1::.,^9T:1'lt focusing on
assistance to the cEEc, the G-24 huu.'Jo*"n  suLessful cooperation among themselves  in
pledging large amoun6 of aid, the distribution of which has been coordinated by the
Commission of the EC. The Four-Put y Ct*pt-which  consists of the EC' US' Japan' and
Canada, focuses on *d" issues dealing tlitft tft. U*gu"y Round' International organizations
zuch as the IMF, OECD, and the United Nations iU$ play crucial roles in coordination
leading to increased global stability.and steady growth'
Recently tf,"rJnun. been cills for increasing cooperation and coordination  within the
framework of the G-i. In his landmark foreigi pou.y speech glven at. The American
university, president crinton indicated the need-foi i""r*t.o attention to be given in this
area: 
cooperation  among the major powers toyrrg world growth is not working
well at 
"ll 
tod"t...;Ve mustiooi "n"* 
at institutions  we use to chart our way
in the global eionomy and ask whether they are serving our interests in this
new world, or whether we need to modify them or create others"'we have got
to try to work more closely together'?
uS Treasury Secretary Lloyd 6rot .n reiterated President clinton's  concerns as well
as proposed a solution:
The G-7 nuri.ir.o somewhat into disrepair. You have a sihration where you
have troubli";;;ties  in many of thi countries of Europe today and Japan
itself...I think what you have to do is have more frequent, informal' private
meetings *ho" the members of the G-7 try to put together a growth policy
that will try to expand the economies of all seven of those countries" 'I would
like to *  ,t. ch Eetback to their original purpose.r
The G-7 has great potential to Serve as the major forum for coordination among its
current participan[ ;; ;"il as influencing the poli"t1 of the regions surrounding them'
However, while the basis exists, the G-7 ,i*t ut! the lessons gained in previous attempts at
coordination *  " 
reservoir or mowteoge in ordel to .n6id repeating past mistakes'
Additionaily, a greater role for internationil  organizations such as the IMF and oEcD must
be assigned. These organizatioqs are able to overcome some of the barriers to cooperation
such as domestic pr.rriro and 6lements of distrust that may exist among.states'
Cooperation between ne participants  of the G-7 
"ntotptttT 1 Yid: 
range of topics'
The past, present, and potential areas of cooperation among the G-7 in the economic and
politiial spheres wilt be examined'-12-
Economic Assistance Pachgcs - Cooperation for thc Bcnefit of All
Since 1989 the term "G-7" has lrecome almost synonymous  with assistance  packages
to the CEEC and the former Soviet Union. Realizing that strong market economies in these
regions would be not only crucial for global stability but also would create a potentially vast
n& market for Western goods and services, the G-7 has responded rapidly to the reforming
countries'  need for assistance. The aid in these packages have not been given without strings
attached.  There are requirements for further economic and political reforms whose progress
is carefully checked by the international hnancial institutions (lFIs) responsible for most of
the assistance.
While the recent assistance  to Russia has been coordinated  by the G-7 (to be examined
in detail later in this study), they realizrA that the larger and more complex long-term
program for the CEEC required the coordinated  action of an increased number of Western
iountries. In forming the Group of 24 (G-24) expressly for the purpose of assisting the
CEEC, one of the three previously mentioned  primary roles the G-7 see themselves as playing
(i.e., "giving impulses to wider negotiations in other bodies") has been successfully carried
out.
The G-24 Assistance Package
At the July 1989 Paris Summit the G-7, noting the urgent need for assistance in
Poland and Hungary, requested that the Commission of the EC coordinate efforts to provide
these countries with aid. Lrss than one month later on I August, the fuS meeting of the G-
24 convened in Brussels. Representatives of the 24 countries consisting of all OECD
members, the 12 EC Member States and other were present. In addition, the IMF, World
Bank (WB) and the Paris Club indicated their willingness to become involved.
An action plan known as PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring
of the Economy) was agreed upon and implemented on 18 December 1989. The agenda for
PHARE focused on areas including agriculture, improved market access in the West,
establishment of training prognrms, and improving the terms for foreign investment.
Due to the rapid increase in reform movements  throughout the CEEC, the G-24 has
extended its scope and currently provides assistance to: Albania, the Baltic States, Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The
total amount of G-24 assistance that had been commitred by the end of 1992 was $50.4
billion. The additional contributions from IFIs brings the total to an astounding $70.4 billion.
The EC and its member states have given the majority of assistance  with 6I% of the total.
The next top three donors have been the US (15%\, the EFTA countries (ll%) and Japan
(7%)."
The PHARE program,  now in is fifth year of operation, has been successful in is
basic objectives of supporting  the reforms in the recipient countries. By providing economic
and technical assistance and guidance,  the program has already helped to place many if the
CEEC on the path to becoming fully integrated into the international  economy. Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia are the furthest advanced in this respect and
currently require increased market access for their goods in the West. However, its record
has not been without disappointments,  and their are many on both the giving and receiving
sides who have been disillusioned.
By examining the manner in which the participans of the G-7 have coordinated their
assistance both multilaterally through the G-24 as well as on a bilateral basis to the CEEC,-13-
the probable direction of the latest G-7 assistance to Russia can be deduced' However' the
experiences,  both positive and negative, of the G-24 assistance package provide valuable
insights inro ways in which u ,nori effective program of assistance  could be implemented-
Cooperation  l-acking Coordination
In summit declarations, the G-7 participanS  have voiced their support equally for
cooperative  action ;;ilt  prwiding tttitt"n.. to the CEEC and Russia' However due to
their varying geogfaphical proximiry, historical and cultural ties, and most importantly' their
ideas of the manner in which assistance should be distributed,  the participants  of the G-7 have
tended to app.roach  the assistance packages $th sg.lewhat different viewpoints' This element
has materialized in both multilateral as well as bilateral  assistance'
The EC and EFTA countries are attempting to form a long-term partnership  with the
CEEC and to a lesser extent the NIS. ttrey reatize-that th: future of F'urope is a community
from the 'Arlantic to the Urals' -O tnoi likely bey94' In order to facilitate this' their
assistance has operated under the motto "hep ?or t"16-helP'" thg E9 has affempted to
encourage inter-regional and inter-repubii. .oope*tion' the Commission has also established
dialogue groups o"t**n itself and individual  CEEC members' The Association Agreements
thathavebeensigrred@utnotratifiedbyatlECcountries)betweenseveralmembersofthe
CEEC and the EC have paved the way f*.  rtoother transition into an enlarged community'
The us currently is focusing on assistance to Russia and the NIS' Instead of viewing
assistance as a means to prepare a potential market, the us sees it as preventing a return to
an iurns race. E"J; thi, iear naioent clinton expressed  this view by stating, "If we are
willing to qpend trillions oi doll"r, to ensure communism's  defeat in the Cold War' surely
we should Ue wiffinllo invest a tiny fraction of that to support democracy's success  where
communism failed-""
In order to ensure continued  political stability, the US has implemented political
education programs. It is also ttre oniy- coulgT to have diplomatic representation  in all of
the NIS countries in addition to Rus;ia. These p"rronnir are able to monitor political
developments as well as report w!er9 assistance is neeOeO most' As can be detected in the
new G-? assistancJ;*kd;;  ,he desire of the US to see increased involvement by the IFIs
has been taken into account-
Japan,withonlyloosetiestgtheCEECandRussia,hasstillcontributedarather
zubstantiat amount to the regions - $3.4 billion to the CEEC and $1'8 billion to Russia'
However, the vast majority of its pledges are linked to private sector investment which to
date has been slow to aPPear.!
In the case of the G-24 assistance package, since the commission was assigned the
role of directing the programs from tf,e deginn-ini, i,. h  been able to bring together the
varying views of the ion-oo and operate a ci,ordin-ated assistance progal' Unfornrnately'
the program has not been able to overcome  the often misleading ierms of assistance or the
mismanagemert  and greed that are often associated with large amounts of funds'
The Terms of the Trade  :
To the already hnancially weak countries in central and eastern Europe Td lY::it'
the type of assistance as well as the terms for its disbursement  are key' of the $50'4 billion
inG-Z4assisance, 
""ry 
srg.g billion have been in grans. The rest are in fact loans' credits
or guarantees against dlfaults. As most of the 1."ceiuet countries are already under pressure-14-
to repay existing western debts, additional loans will be an extra burden in the long run' The
US t'OjZl and banada (69%) have been the most generous in the proportion of grants in
their assistance to the G-24 program. The EC (32%) and Japan (22%) have opted for a focus
on other terms.
Although necessary from the financial viewpoint of the G-7 participants and the IFIs,
especially in the current economic tlownturn, the criteria attached to the disbursement of
assistance can often prevent pledged amounts from being released. Of $re G-24 assistance,
only about half has been disbursed. An additional factor that prevens assistance from being
.ffotiu. is the system of distribution that exiss (or does not exist) in the individual countries.
The systems in tire CEEC, due primarily to having gained experience, are more advanced and
less comrpt. than those in Russia and the NIS. A senior Western official expressed his
concerns  about the new G-7 package with the following statement, "There is no point handing
over even $5 billion if it is merely going to end up in the Swiss bank accounts of the ruling
elites. "13
An alarming report by the EC's Court of Auditors has brought to light the extent of
assistance never reaching its intended target. The study revealed that more than 4A7o of the
disbursed aid has neen pocketed by western service firms for 'assistance, consultancy  and
study..t The well-documented case of the misguided management of the European Bank
for heconstnrction  and Development (EBRD) shows another problem associated with the
current G-24 assistance package. As can be seen from the 'lesson' prollded by the EBRD,
the G-7 and the IFIs have stili to further their education in providing effective assistance.
The Potential for Improved Coordination and Effectiveness
The G-7 has the potential for improving the record of assistance  packages. Their
recent generous pledge to Russia demonsffates that they are willing and able to coordinate
the initial f,rnancial aspect. Even though there has been a division of responsibility  between
the G-7 and G-24 pa&uges,  the G-7 must use the erperiences  encountered by the G-24 as a
guide.
An assistance expert with the US Mission to the EC recently stated her belief that in
order to increase the effectiveness of assistance  packages there must be a rnore active dialogue
betrveen donors and recipients. It is also necessary for the donors to better coordinate their
assistance and to look ai the sitrntion from a broader, regional perspective.3t A repeat of
the 1991-1992  Washington-Lisbon-Tokyo  meetings in which working groups discussed the
best ways to distribute G-24 assistance would also be beneficial for the G-7 assistance to
Russia.
From a practical standpoint,  programs  focusing on managerial and skill-building are
needed. By training trainers i multiplier effect will be created thereby eventually  lessening
the need for assisance. In order to allow these regions to become fully integfated into the
global economy, which is the expressed  wish of the G-7, Western  markets must be opened
Ior their good;. It is only in this way that the CEEC and Russia will be able to reimburse
their generous supporters.15-
Trade vs- Aid
nwe're not standing here with an outstretched empty hand. we've got
something in it to offer in return'"r
- A Polish chief financial officer
The emerging market economies have not been spared the protectionist  tendencies of
the troubled westerieconomies.  while trade is widely seen as being complementary to aid,
market access for Eastern European goods has been slow to appear'
The EC,s Association Agreements  have recently come under attack by offrcials of the
CEEC for moving i-  rto* in-ofrering the promised access and instead placing new trade
barriers for goods such as steel, texlles, and agriculture  that compete with threatened
Community industries. [n 1992 the EC had a $l.i Uittion zurplus with the,most advanced
countries of central and eastern Europe 'in effect making a tidy prof,rt off its struggling
neighbours."r,  Sir t-eon Brittan, the EC's Commissioner  for external economic  affairs'
expressed  his view of the issue: 'we must open our markets as well as our hearts and minds
to the East...The Ctmmunity's  trade and foreign ministers would do well to take note that
a more prosperous Eastern Europe will mean more EC exports "ld 
more jobs' "rt
Fortunately,  the Ec foreign ministers have taken note and responded !o the need for closer
relations with the CEEC and Russia. At the 2l-22 June European summit, the iszue of
eventual memUersnil foi the countries with Association Agreements *9 ry 
further opening
of community maries will be discussed. Additionalty, President  Boris Yeltsin will attend
the meeting io sign a partnership agreement with the EC which is hoped to lead to an
eventual free trade agr6*"ot. rtre o-ttrer participants ofthe G-7 would also do well to heed
Sir Brittan's advice.
The participants of the G-7, as a group and individually have a v.es.ted interest in the
emerging CEEC and Russia. The assis[nce packages,  although containing their share of
problems,  have the potential to not onty staUitin mu region, but- allow it to flourish'
However, along with increasen coopera'ti9n and coordination in the area of providing
assistance, in order to set a good example for these emerglng market economies,  they will
also need to increase efforts among themselves to implement the t9.n"T of free trade'
especially increased market access and decreased protectionism, as outlined in the GATT'
"Openess cannot be kep up for a privileged few to enjoy. If it is walled up,
it dies."
- Arttrur Dunkel, Director General of GATT
24 May 1993
If their past record is any indication, the S-7 meeting in Tokyo this year will have
tittle positive impact on tf," suciessful conciusion of the O tiZ y."t old UmgUay Roundof
GATT negotiationr. e, previousty  noted, dre past four summits have called for solid
progress towards its comftetion. .Whil. 
progess tras inOeeO been made, its has not been solid
but instead has been characterized  Oy ra'ttrer zudden breakthroughs followed often by
breakdowns._16_
However, as has been also witnesse<l in its history, the pcrsonalities_ and ncgotiating
strengths of the heads of state or government as well as of their finance and foreign ministers
can bi instrumental  in overcoming  existing barriers. Even though President Clinton is not
the first leader to proclaim the conclusion  of the Uruguay Round as his highest priority, its
key position in hii strategy for improved global economic health indicates that he and his
administration will indeed make eveqy effort-
When asked recently why he thought an end was in sight following  so many previous
such estimations, US Trade Representative  Mickey Kantor first joked, "Maybe naivete"3e
before continuing by pointing out the effective leadership and pragmatic position President
Clinton has shown as well ^ 
ttt" increased willingness  of the other major trading partners to
negotiate. During the first week of May, Kantor also indicated the Clinton Administration's
ptopos.d time-table for a conclusion of the Uruguay Round by December 15, 1993'
indicating the Commission's equally strong desire to see the round concluded following the
schedule of the US Sir tron li.itt o, Kantor's EC negotiating partner stated, "l really do
believe this deadline is the last one.'e
G-7 Trade Cooperation  - No Proud Past
From the very frrst declaration presented at the 1975 Rambouillet  Summit, the G-7
have pledged themseives  to cooperate in achieving tnrly free global trading system- ln words
that hold particularly true 18 years after they were first written, the S-7 stated:
We must seek to restore growth in the volume of world trade. Growth and
price stability will be fostered by maintenance of an open trading system- In
i period where pressues  are developing for a relurn to protectionism, it is
essential ... to avoid resorting to measues by which they could try to solve
their probtems  at the expense of others, with damaging consequences  in the
economic, social, and political fields.n'
Unfortunately,  their past success (or lack thereof) in cooperating  to implement  effective trade
policy actions also holds true 18 years later.
The S-7 called for progiess in the Tokyo Round of GATT talls in their 1975
Declaration and in the next three zuccessive declarations urged its completion- With the
round finalty being concluded in December 1978, and signed in April 1979, the S-7 were
able to endorse thJ package at the 1980 Venice Summit. Notably, it was the previous US
Democratic President Jimmy Carter who, by agreeing to a more modest pact, was able to
achieve what alluded the two previous Republican presidents.o2 For the sake of the global
trading system's future prospe.ity, it may be a good sign that history tends to repeat itself-
- 
tn non-GATT related issues, their record is not much improved.  The iszue of East-
West trade, focusing on limiting export credits to the Soviet Union was hotly discussed  at the
1982 Versaitles Summit. While the US wanted quantitative limits, the Europeans wanted to
take a more cautious approach. The compromise  that was reached fell apart a few weeks
after the summit. President Reagan, feeling betrayed by the actions of European leaders,
extended sanctions on the Soviet pipeline construction project to include US subsidiaries
operating in Europe. The ensuiig backlash of criticism and later defltance of the US move
biought fade relitions between Europe and the US to such a low point that the EC trade
negotiator stated "Our trade relations with the United States are the worst that I have seen
since the end of the war."'3-17-
The Uruguay Round
Launched in September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, the uruguay Round (uR)
is the eighth round of bRff tatts. Covering 15 diverse negotiating areas it has proven to
be the most ambitious as welt as contentious round. It was originally scheduled to be
completed by the entl of 1990, however, due to many factors, it is still awaiting the
signitures of ttt. I I I Contracting  Parties of the GATT'
The uruguay Round encompasses three major areas: l) GATT 93 - this agteement
will be a revision or tn, Tokyo Round pact; 2) General Agreement for Trade in Services
(GATS) - the aim of this agieement witt be to establish common international rules and
monitor progress in this rapidly growing sector; 3) Trade Related aspects of Intellectual
property rigfiA (fnfpS). fn oti"ifor ttrJ Un to be concluded, all Contracting  Parties must
Dunkel, at the time the Director General of GATT,
which had been laboriously prepared by him through
While being the basis for current discussions, the DFA
agree to these three areas.
In December 1991, Arthur
presented a draft Final Act (DFA)
negotiations  with many of the parties.
i6elf was not accePted.
Progress at [,ong l-ast
Iate in November 1992, after several tense months and many transatlantic flights, the
EC and US agfeed on a revision of the DFA section on agriculture.  Known as the Blair
House Accor4 this agreement allowed the stalled UR negotiations t9 continue' However'
the Accord covered oily rwo of the three necessary  sections involved in the agricultural  text'
While export subsidies and internal zupport yeie Oe{1 with, the more sensitive topic of
market access was left hanging over the negotiation table.
The first few montli o}tnir year have witnessed a series of votleys between the EC
and US involving threats of starting Trade Wars I (over steel) and II (over puql:
procurement).  However, to the creOiiof both sides, and in particular the negotiating skills
of USTR Mickey Kantor and Sir L,eon Brittan, the differences  have been resolved
'peacefully'.
Iate in April an agreement  was reached in the long-running E91Ul conflict over
pubtic procurement purchasing rules, 
- 
The US complaint *.s ou.t Article 29 of the EC's
Utilities Directive r"t i.t, gives-EC bidders a37o pncipreference  over foreign bidders as well
as allowing bids with tess ttran a 50% European  content to be disregarded.  The EC replied
by pointing out the discriminatory 'Buy American".Act as well as US restrictions on who
could bid for federal utilities. The agreement  consists of the EC removing the Article 29
preference for heavy electrical  equipment while the US has opened -up its bidding system'
The importanc" of 'tfr, .o*protir" fot the GATT talks was stated in one report: - .ry
dispute risked escalating into a tit-for-tat trade war, wrecking hopes of progress in the GATT
Uruguay Round-"'
Light at the End of the Tunnel
Now that the EC and uS have settled their dispute on procurement, they have.turned
their attention to the n"riJ"pt that need to be taken io .o*plet" the Round- Early in May
Mickey Kantor explained the strategy: "What we're attempting to d9 is work on market
access in the u-gu.y Round and hail a preliminary ugree*"nt on market access' especially-18-
in the industrial products area and services, prior to thl G-7 meeting in Tokyo' "05
on 13 May, the French Government presented its new position on trade policy' At
tirst glance it was seen as a possible stumbling  block on the way to Tokyo' Released by
Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, it called for among other things a review of EC trade
policy, criticized the US for its unilateral actions, defended Community subsidies' and
tlemanded for the Blair House Accord to be opened for further negotiations- However,
several aspects of the shift in policy were greeted by the EC as well as GATT officials as
being positive steps.
The long-stantling  issue of agriculture has recently had a breakthrough which will
allow progress  in the otfrlr 14 areas of 1h" GATT to be taken' The EC Agricultgre  Council
meeting thal took place during the last week of May resulted in France being granted the
important  concession of increases in subsidies to French farmers who take land out of
production. This reform in the Community's Common A.griculture Policy (CAP) as well as
their likely acceptance of the Blair House iccord, will allow the other issues of the GATT
to be discussed- French Agriculture Minister Jean Puech stated: "we have reached a
compromise that appears reaiiy positive for France and Europe' We will have a more open
attitude in international talks. "'
Recently,  Prime Minister Balladur stated that in the past the trade negotiations "were
too much and perhaps even too organized, as a sort of confrontation  between the uS and EC
... All subjecS, *i  no, just agrilulture,  urust be really negotiated and atl parties' not just
europeans, must adopt a positive affitude' "'
It seems as if the EC and uS negotiators  at the 14 May 4-Parly Toronto meeting had
been listening to Prime Minister Ballaud=ur's words. They combined forces in pressing {1pq
to reduce its industrial and othertrade barriefs as well as bp"oing its markets.' An EC official
stated: "we certainly ni"t tt" time has come for the Japanese  to make their contribution to
the debate.'*  Even though Japan recently agreedto  reduce its tariffs by 55% on nearly 800
products, the Commission iniends to press for further reductions.  Japanese government
official, though rebuking the claim thatiapan has not.t"i" its share of effort to conclude the
UR, agreed along with banada that the G-? Summit in Tokyo should be a deadline for a 4-
Party agreement on market access.
Meeting again on the fringe of the oECD's annual meeting 2-3 lune, the 4-Party
group r"Oe n rtttJr progress to*"idt meeting their agreed upon deadline- However, Japan
and the US were *"Ud to reduce their diffJrences. Japan tontinued to stand firm against
US pressures  to acc€pt a policy of managed trade in whicir quantified levels of imports would
be encouraged. Mickey Kantor 
"*proid 
the optimism  which emerged from the second in
a series of zl-party t"teetings: "I bilieve *" ar" in striking distance ol-  a-greement which
could be the largest market access agreement in history."s RepresentaryT from the EC and
the other 3 partilipating countries are scheduled to meet once more in Tokyo on23-24lvne
before the G-7 summit-
The Summit and BeYond
According to an official on the Commission's Uruguay Round SlTring Group'-the
most the S-7 can hope to accomplish concerning market iccess in the UR is to give their
approval for a specific market access package. lince the participants of the G-7 do not
r.iirrr"nt the other Contracting  Partiei in Gltf,  they cannot decide for all members'
However, if they are able to reach an agreement, it widbe the starting point to concluding
the UR. At this point, all other negotiaEons are stalled due to the difficulties in the area of_19-
market access. The same ofhcial expressed her optimism-for a successful Summit due to the
fact that the S-7 seem more intent on reaching a conclusion than in previous summits's
Even if the s-7 is successful  in reaching a preliminary agr€ement on market' there are
still many other areas to be resolved before tfre dn can be concluded' On26 May' Jacques
Delors called fOr the area of liberalization  of services to be focused on' The uS' who has
longpressedtheECtoworkmoreactively!9y"'sreceivingafirmcommitmentfrom
developing countries that national treatment will be given to foreign service operations'  was
no doubt pleased by Mr. Delors, statement.  Additional areas that still must be resorved are
the issues of countervailing duties, tariff peaks, ild textiles' In the case of textiles' the
Multi-fiber Agreement (MFA) will need io be revised in order to be integrated into the
existing GATI framework.
The question of establishing  a multilateral  trade organization (MTo) may also prove
to be a further poin; of contention. ttt  VfTO envisaged would be a common body designed
ro coordinare the three areas of the uR (i.e., GATT, 9+TS, 
and TRIPS)' It would have
powers of enforcement for these agreet*tt as well as being able to implement sanctions as
a form of cross-retaliatioo against contracting p"niT who are not fonowing established  rules-
The Ec views the MTo as being.*.i"t to-keep the uR functioning since the contracting
parties who do "", ".p"" 
,"*i.J, or intellectuai property (most often developing countries)
may not enforce tne rutes as agreed upon. Therefore, the industrial countries  who have much
at stake in these two areas must be able to retaliate by implementing sanctions  on these
countries' goods.5t
TheUSbelievesthattheMTowashastilyputtogether.Theruleallowingacountry
to waive a specific element by having 213 of ini Cootracting Parties in-agreemant  is of
particurar cotrcern io ne us a; this is"seen as a potential loophore- The uS is also against
a possibte MTO 'di.tutiog' trade_o1 tnuiton*"nttt policies to the US't If accepted' the
framework and structure of the MTo witt most likely be a compromise that all Contracting
Parties will be able to work with'
,There is also an obstacle  developing  that may hinder the ratification of the UR by the
US. The Clinton Administration',  ..q,i.rifor an extension of fast-track authority of the UR
until 15 December  has not yet been aiproved by the US Senate. Two Democratic senators
have recently demanded tnat in order tor them to approve the extension, a renewal of Super
301 would need tO be attached to the ertension tegislation.  Super 301, out ofuse since 1991,
a[ows the usrR to point out priority -r"it tradJpractices in priority countries so as to self-
initiate the unitatefi reprisals allowed under Section 301 of the US Trade Act' However'
even if super 301 legislation  is approved, there is no assurance  that the US will indeed use
it po**  There is-quite an arnount of discretion surrounding its use'
with the ,t pri.g down of GATT Director Arthur Dunkel after ten y."ttt' P*:
Sutherrand was serected  as his repracement on 9 June. with his accession to this powerful
position, tn" ,.ny ourt".r* stiti existing may in fact be minimized- According to one
report:
sutherland thintG the time for platitudes about free trade from the leading
industrial nations is over. He now considers that the time has come to point
accusing fingers at govefnments about their own adherence to free trade'
instead of allowing governments to go on accusing others about their
shortcomings-53-20-
The potential that the upcoming Tokyo Summit  has for not only delivering the crucial
breakthrougt for the UR, but also foi impioving  the scarred record of G-7 cooperation  on
trade issues is vast. Fortunately, current signs indicate that those involved in the G-7 and
GATT processes realizethe absolute crucial deadline this summit represen8. The credibility
of the G-7 process as well as the workability of the GATT system -.  .t. stake' If the S-7
fail to agreeon a preliminary market access accord, the uR may still be salvagal- However,
the repuEtion of the G-7 for dealing with trade issues will not.
Coor.dination of monetary policy with the objective of encouraging  seady growth
through stable exchange rates has arguably been the primary Putpgt: of the G-7 and most
definilly of the closel! rehted G-5 and G-10. Working together and in conjunction with the
Interim commi$ee  of n" IMF, the G-7 finance ministers  and central bank governors  have
been quietly and modestly progressing in their coordination  of macroeconomic  and monetary
policiis. Wttitr not atwlys successful, the stnrcture and organization  behind their actions
'h"u. 
.n*uraged a level oi.mpe*tion rivalled only by the EC's process for Economic  and
Monetary Union (EMU).
The Process - Key to Their Success
As stated previously, a new Group of Seven Finance Ministers forum was established
at the 1986 Venice Summit. This action, the formal enlargement of the G-5 to include
C-anada and ltaly, was intended to foster closer coordination through more frequent meetings
between the summits. The G-7 finance ministers and ientral bank governors meet several
times a year in order to d.iscuss sensitive iszues pertaining to monetary policy- The rezuls
of these meetings, which are often useful for business enterprises, are public knowledge-
However,  due to the possibility of insider trading, they are much more discreet than other
G-7 meetings. The finance diputies gfoup, who act as agenda determining_sherpas, meet
frequently on *  ad hoc basis as well as continuously keeping each other informed of new
deuetopments  via telephone discussions.  Additionally the central bank governors,  varying in
the degree of independence from individual finance ministers, share exchange rate policies
with each other. Taken together, this well-established process of coordination  has been
largely responsible for their continuing progress-
The Background - A Series of Slow, Tentative Steps
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the G-7 found it necessary to rely
more on the IMF as a forum for monetary coordination.  At the 1975 Rambouillet Summit,
the members amended the IMF's Articles of Agreement so that members were obligated to
"pursue economic policies conducive to stability ... [and established] a range of permissible
eichange rate regimes, including floating and cooperative arrangements  like the European
'snake'."s The Interim Committee  adopted this amendment early the next year.
The next step in monetary policy coordination was taken seven years later at the 1982
Versailles  Summit. The memberJagreed to "strengthen our cooperation with the IMF in its
work of surveillance  and to develop this on a multilateral  basis. "t5
The Plaza Agreement  of September 1985 and the l,ouwe Agreement  of February  l9E7
were the next moves in the G-7 commitnent of mutual surveillance and coordination of-21 -
exchange rate movements. Both of these agreements, synchronizing exchange rates in order
to respectively decrease  and increase the vilue of the US Dollar, focused on increasing  the
stability of exchange  rates. The fact that these agreements  were concluded away from summit
meetings,  attests to the effectiveness of the C-ltc-tO finance ministers group and their
coordiiation with the IMF Interim Committee'
Europe as a Model
The G-7 has noted the progress of the Ec's European  Monetary System' remarking
on its contribution-ro-"..onomic-poticy  convergence  and monetary stability"s within the
Community.. Additionally, the tttaastriitrt Treaty calling for increased  convergence through
irpf.r""""tion of EMU *u, ,on as "a historiC step" for further European integration'
The European Community  possesses many factors that have been advantageous to
convergence includini , trigt.t teveiof geographicll  and cultural proximity than exists among
the G-7 as well ^ """r6o-ng 
political and broad economic impetus " ' providing a strong
momentum and pressure for-integntion that does not exist across the globe' "t'
Although there are s"u".ai elements inherent in the European process which prevent
a perfect .o.p"rr*n with any possible future G-7 system of monetary coordination' its
experiences may still be used as a model for a potentiai  system involving the floating of the
ECU/$US/yen. nlact, the EC's objectives foi the frrst of three stages leading to EMU read-
nearly identicar to those consistentry  expressed  b_v the G-7 declarations: "The attainment of
G.i1o degree or.onu"rgence of 
-economic 
andmonetary  coordination"st and also includes
muttilateral surveillance  procedures'
An indication of the use of ERM/EMU as a model is underscored by G-7 members
comparing their economic situation with those required by EMU as stated in the Maastricht
Treaty. L,ooking to the fuhue, US Ambassador to the EC James Dobbins stated recently in
a speech:
President Clinton's proposed tax and tevenue cuts will, in fact, allow the US
by 1997 to meet all-the economic criteria contained in the Maastricht Treaty
for entry into the EMU. The United States is not, of course, an applicant  for
entry into EMU. But the new Administration is intent on closer consultations
and more effective coordination  between Europe and the United States on
macroeconomic and monetary policy within the G-7's
The qpeculator-induced  crisis which befell the exchange  ryte mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary system (EMS) on 14 September lgg2, after five years of surprising
stability, forced tf,L gritistr pound and the Itatian lira to drop out 9f g: .system 
while the
Spanish peseta, eortuguese es9ud9 and the lrish punt were devalued' While some saw this
as being due to 'faulilines' in the ERM, a meeting late in May of e! nna131 *^1!:f
concluded that trre system itself is technically sound and the crisis was due to the economtc
-O pofiti.al conditions  that have developed around it in the Community'
Two separate reports from Europ"-..nnal governors and senior monetary officials
noted the stmin that Geiman unification tuo placed on the German economy  resulting in an
inflexible monetary poticy detrimental to othei EC members; the crisis of confidence created
by the Danish ,noi vote in its original referendum of the Maastricht Treaties; as well as the
variances between US/EC interest rates'
The recommendations  that followed  the release of the studies included  a call for more
sringent following of established EMS guidelines, especially those involving increased-22-
a_djustments in the ERM. Another involved a change in past policy concerning the obligation
of Member States to support each other's currencies, now to be only a 'voluntary action'.
Two additional points echoed the most recent statements of the G-7 and IMF Interim
Comminee. First, ths necessiry of improved communication  between members on issues
concerning  exchange rates and their realignment was stressed as was "plain speaking,  a
,confrontation  on policy issues' and a critical probing of forecasts and policy intentions-"@
Second, . p.ogrm involving increased multilateral surveillance of confidential
economic indicators  should be implemented in order to establish an "early warning system"
so that moves could be taken to avoid another crisis. However, now that the Maastricht
Treaties are viftgally assured to be ratified by atl Member States, this system will
automatically  be imPlemented-
nrtiCte 103 of the Treaty on European Union
multilateral surveillanc€ ils well as giving the Council
monetary policy of individual Members by stating:
Where it is established ... that the economic policies of a Member  State are
not consistent with broad guidelines ... or that they risk jeopardising the
proper funaioning of economic and monetary union, the Council may, acting
by qualified majority on a recourmendation from the Commission,  make the
necessary recOmmendations tO the Members States concerned.t'
Apparently realizing the benefits of Article 103 of the EC's MaasFicht Treaty, the G-7
finance mioisters, central bank governors and the IMF tnterim Committee recently granted
the IMF power to "blow the whistle and cry foul if atry country's economic_  and exchange
rate policies threaten to create curTency turmoil and upset the internatisnel ss6lsunity's
efforts 69 achieve greater gfowth. "e This new dweloprn€nt expands the scope of the IMF,
which previously  had focused on countries in debt-
The Future
Moneary poticy, an integral part of overall economic policy can help or hinder the
prospects for economii growth, both for an individual coun0ry as well as for a group. The
in6viOuat economic gfowth packages in the EC, US, and Japan can be seen as part of a
global glowth strategy. The G-7 finance ministers, who will be reviewing the results of
closer cooperation as concefiis the individual growth packages at the Tokyo Summit, have set
in motion a truly multilateral  strategy of coordination through the recently announced  system
of surveillance by the IMF.
At ttreir most recent meeting or 29 April, while discussing their approach for the
future, the group reaffirmed their mutual pursuit of coordinated  growth policies, and agreed
to "closely coordinate currency market operations tandl beser reflect economic
fundamentals."6
The funre status of the of the EC in the G-7, and particularly the G-7 finance
ministers and central bank goveqors group, will be profoundly  altered with the start of Stage
III in the process towards EMU: This final stage, set to begin in 1997 at the earlieS and
1999 at ttrl htest, will bring into existence the European  System of Central Banks (ESCB)
composed  of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national banl6 of the member states-
The ECSB will be independent from the C-ommunity  institutions and be responsible,  anong
other things, for monetary policy while the ECB will be responsible for issuing EC currency.
sets out the procedures  for closer
greater power to intervene in the_23 _
While it will be independent, the ECSB will support the economic policies of the EC'
The crucial point as concerns the G-7 is that, as stated in Article 109 of the Maastricht
Treaty:
agre€menrs involving mooetafy  or foreign exchange regime matters need to be
negotiated uy tn co"mmunity-... the council' acting by qualified majority on
a retrommeudation  from the Commission  and after consulting the ECB' shall
decide tne arrangements for the negotiation and for the conclusion of zuch
agreements. These iuTangements  shall ensure that the community expresses
a single Position-t
with the .o,r,o'i'y to act for all member states, the Community's  single voice will
speak where currently 4 + | are heard- While there rnay be sgml difficulties  with the
European members-#the G-7 relinquishing their currgnt-powen and effectively changing the
G-7 tgthe G-4 where monetary matters arJconcerned, the strengthened common position of
the EC will be aute io-carry more weight in the area oj economic and monetary policy, thus
ensuring tte EC's becoming a 'true' member of the G-7'
"The partnership of North America, Europe, and Japan is a guarantee of peace
and stabilitY in the world"
-1985 Bonn Summit Political Declaration
on thd occasion of the 40th' Annive$ary
of the end of WWII
with its origins based firmly in the economic and monetary topics., the G-7 at first did
not op€nly discuss o, *o*.e  declarations on issues involving potitica or secrnity affairs'
However, the interde,pendence  of economic and political ma$e; hpidty encouraged the G-7
to include both spheres in their agenda for cooperation. In the case of the zummit
.trmuoique,  tnis trenO, which U.g* at the 1978 Bonn Summit with a spontaneous
declarationonhijacking,hesincreaseOtothepointryherethepasseveralS-Tpolitical
dectarations have covered more international  potitical and security  iszues in greater depth than
the economic declarations have for economic issues'
The Process
Atthe5smmits,theforeignministersoftheG-Tparticipanbareseatednexttotheir
country,s nead of state or govemm€rt md finance ministers. There they anempt to agree on
the future policies and strategies  in thc field of politics and scurity- To rytitt in defining
these plans and to put them into action politicar ditoto.r, who are the head of their state's
foreign affairs ri"ir"y and report direcily to their fgreign minister, meet at least five times
per year oo a very informal b*T. 'ino. meetingJ are not hteoded for making or
implementing Aecisions but instead serve as a coosttttati"s 6schanism' These political
directors act under-the  authority of the sherpas in preparing and irnplementinFG'7  qolttlo'
ln addition, *ottiog goupt t'r"t fo* to five times a*uity P S*t*  tle topics for the
summits and pre,pari ptopot.d agenda items for the political declratron'--24-
Political Cooperation: A United Force
The history of the G-7 includes several examples of zuccessful cooperative action in
the political and security arenas. Emphasized repeatedly year after year have been actions
to prevent internationi terrorism. tne G-Z pledqed. early on !o support each other in
preventing  the spread of terrofist action by establishing increasingly more detailed and
effective measures rncluding mutual extradition procedures, closer bilateral and multilateral
cooperation  benveen potice"ana security organizatioN, 6 well as agreeing to implementing
a.n anns embargo for countri., ,utpt ted of zupporting terrorists' Their 1978 Bonn
Declaration has been reafhrmed and extended in content over the pa.st several years'
Regions of internationat conflict outside the G-7 have also been addressed'
Continuing upheaval in the Middle East has been seen as not only dangerous to the area and
its people,-Uut atso as a possible threat to the global supply of oil' The UN has been singled
ouirt tl" Uot forum for the resolution of the turmoil'
East-West issues have figured prominently in the political d{ogot of the G-7'
Beginning with the condemnatiJn of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the G-7 has
progressiiely  become more active in its cooperative neasures toward the countries of Eastern
and central Europe and the (former) Soviet union. In 1989 the S-7, with respect to the
reform movements, stated: "we hope that freedom will be broadened and democracy
,t 
"ogtn*.0 
ano Oat they form the basl, after decades of military confrogatioa,  ideological
antag-onism and mistrul, for increased dialogUe and cooperation'"6 As mentioned
fr"uio*ty, the G-7 has zupported  the reform of the CEEC and recently  Russia with economic
and technical &ssistmce, rui ttey have also cooperated with one another and international  fora
in key political and security elements.
Security Cooperation:  A Weapon for Peace
Up untit 1990, the G-7 had taken the military *!"gy of deterrenceand the view that
strength in nuclear and conventional  weapons would be the best policy to deter any possible
SoviJt threat. However, with the rapid changes that were occurring as well q th" num€,rous
new fora for cooperation  in the area brse"urity, such as NATo's NorthAtlantic Cooperation
Council (NACCj and the Conference on Security  and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)' the G-
7 were able to change to a policy seeking mutual disarnamen:t.
Beginning *in Or 1990 iummitG-7 participans,  whether or not they bad signed the
Treaty oo Xoo-ptotiferation  of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), have commined themselves to
progress in the area of non-proliferation  and have urged all non-signatory countries to sign
il.L"ty. Additionally in 1089, the G-7 established  the Missile Technolory  Control Regine
(MTCR| which is dgsiped to control the spread of missiles capable of carrying nuclear,
.n.^irul, and biologid warheaG.t Since its inception, matry other states have agreed to
follow the guidelines set forth in this agreement.
The G-7 have recognized  tbat thJy must utilize the relevant international  organizations
and agreements focusing in political  anO security affairs. fs rhis end, they have recently
U"goito call for tne strJngnening of the United Nations (UN). In 1991 the S,-7 stated: "We
commit ogrselves to naking ne UN sEooger, more efEcient, and more effective-  - -The UN's
i"f" i" peacekeeping shoui<t be reinforced and we are pre'pared to support this stron$ly'"t
While tire G-Z nas no real institutionalized relationship  with the UN, the rend has baen to
make the group a high-level laboratory for reformist thinking on issues concerning the UN_25-
and particularly for d^iscussion of membership in the Security corrncil'8
The cscE, significantly strength.n"d thtough the 1990 charter of Paris for a New
Europe, has been ui.i.l ,, , uit"t forum for maintaining peace and stability in Europe as
well as the Asian ,r!ion. while Japan is not a full tt^b"t (and does not seek to be)' it is
a ,special guest, ,,oJ",o*y issues qt.t.  dealt with in this group have direct implications
for Japan and all of Asia. r.raro and the wEU's moves to work with the cscE have been
supporteduyttrec-z.However,theuShasquestionedthesecurityimplicationsforthe
North Atlantic Alliance if wEU membership will be automaticauy granted to annew
,members of the EC.'o
WhiletheMaastrichtTreaty'sartictesforstrengtheningEuropeanPolitical
Cooperation,(EPC) will have no direct effect on the G-7 the implications of a strooger
European community political voiggJwtrich  commission president  Delors bas openly urged
to be pursred more rapidty than EMU) that is more articurate as well as dynamic are obvious.
There arready are feerings amotrg the non-European  members of the G-7 that the EC focuses
to an inappropriately  high degree on Euro-ctottit issues' In the future' this rnay cause
friaion amorg the ParticiPants-
The Future Potential
Thisyear,sTokyoSurrmitwillmostlikelycontinuetoshowstrongcooperationin
political and security issues. .However, 
due to tire urgent economic pressures for visible
progress in the u*gLt R"un! and more coordination in the assi$ance to Russia, it has been
predicted that then?frJ *d q1lry declarations  will not be in the spotlight. According
b a commissioo otn"i.r on the pc's b-7 working gryry, there will be a heavy emphasis on
secrnity including r""-p-ftt*tn"n 1ie., extensi;lf Oe Npf beyond is current expiration
at the end of lgg5t;.i..p"rt  controls for dual-use technology. The G-7 wish to impress
upon Russia the i.d"oi  of-security io th: post+ommunisr  rearity and to establish long-
term initiatives with them. In the podca sphere, g.- qu$* of burden-sharing will likely
be ad&essed, ryecifically focusing on the role of the US and Japan in assistance to the
CEEC. The G-7 will also contimre to act as a lobby on the Bosnian iszue'" Japan will
press for G_7 *ppo;* 
"lresolution 
of the northern islands dispute between Japan and
hussia, althoug!-tiey intend to solve the issre bilarcrally.
The substance of G-7 economiipotitical,  and security cooperation and coordinadon
is indeed irDportant, and has ueen oemonstrateo,  fr"r h"d a ravoralt-e impact in advancing the
progress or e.oooii. growth and international stability. Howeve'r,  as was made clearly
visibre in tle rcceot G-7 Emergency summit focusing oo ao to Russia and its direct positive
influence on tbe R'ssian referendum ten oays later, tf,e timing of G-7-cooperative action can
be key to is effectiveness. rne aspect Jfr.i"g iombined *ia tnr instmmental  high-level
pressure  unique b[;etprocess isyhere a g.o,tamount  of potenti{ exists for turtlrer Cr7
and s-7 success in eco"onic and political cooperation and coordination'_26-
G-7 Assistance:  To Russia With ['ove
"WeshouldextendtotheRussianpeoplenotahandofpirybut
a hand of partnership'" 
-us  Secretary of  state warren
ChristoPher, 22 March 1993
ThesituationsulToundingG-TassistancetoRussiaorthe(former)SovietUnioncan
be described as a c'se of catch-22.  The members of the G-7 have been hesitant to provide
any substantia acrount of direct assistance in the abseoce of solid and progressive reforrns
in Russia. However, the dire economic and political siuration in Russia have made any
zubstantial reform without western assistarce which would ressen the negative impacts, nearly
impossible  due to th; ftttth* hardshipi they would uryg about in the short-term'  while
humanitarian ,oir,un". has been forthcoming from the participants  of 
3. " 
G-7 on an
individual basis thereby diverting severe tuffoiog among the poallation of.Russia  and the
NIS, in terms of direci or ind.irect economic assistance,  substantial  amounts have been slow
to be pledged and."* ,ro*.r to be disburs€d.  while blame could be placed equally on the
G-7 as well as Russia fOr the slow pace of progress in this area, what is more important at
this point for both parties is to learn from pas rltuko, address currert realities,  and proceed
as partners into the funne.
The Fir* Moves Forward
Atthe Houston Sumnit in 1990, West Germany and France afieryted to convince the
other members or o" o."o for a coordinated assistance  p ackageto-the r"i"t 
union along the
lines of the oneyearold G-24 program focusing on the CEEC' However' due to the
hesitancy of other members what was eventually announced in the final communique was the
cautious move or 
"irqu"tt 
for a study to t*"tio" the Soviet economy and recommend  means
under which Western assistance couli be used most effectivAy' fr?.d*  {luded 
to the fact
that before any aid would be even considered,  further reforms would need to take place'
The lggl London summit did tiule to advance serious discussion on the proposed
assistance to the Soviet Union. At the precedent-seting special session immediately  after th.e
summit, Soviet President Mikhail Goriachev pto*t i $ *t  with a 23 page document  11
which he described his plans for economic refo'rms as well as 31 additional pages of proposals
of ways the G-7 could assist his country.z However, due to the fact that these proposals
had no focused ,fr.t"gy behind them, Gorbachev went "away from th9 G-7 meeting with liUle
more than p,.gri* Jitechnical help for his collapsing econoay and sevenencouraging  pats
sn the shoulder. 't  A smell Sep fo'nvard that would tater attow greater-strides in assistance
to be taken was the associate memlenttip in the IMF granted to the USSR'
During ne first half of 1992, with Russia ptotitiog reforms i".o:" monetary poli?-'
the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors begai to step up their consultations  with
each other and the IMF over the viabilif of an tssiSatrce package to Russia as well as
membership for the NIS countries. On f ipttf lgg2, five days befgre lgsident 
Yelsin was
to open a session of the Russian  Parfiament, tn c-z announced a$24 billion ptan comprised
of: $11 biltion fr,om the G-7, $4.5 billion from international financial institutions, $2'5
billion in debt restnrcturing  from the Paris club, and a $6 billion ruble sabilization fund'-27 -
Explaining why G-7 assistance had been granted at this stage and not earlier' President
Bush stated:
This [wasl a complex set of issues which took months to sort out, working
within the tUSl aiministration, working with our major allies and. with the
leaders of the new independent  states of ttt. former Soviet Union' A number
ef things had to come iogether to make sure we got it right."
US SecretarY of State Baker added:
We've said that the first step was to match outside support with self-help'
And it has been recently in the past few months that we've seen Russia
particutarly move in the area of tObpting credible economic  programs'"
Two months later at the Munich Summit, after the G-7 finance ministers and central
bank governors had met with Russian Prime Ministcr Gaidar to work out a muurally
agfeeable Russian 'r.f-n"p' reformplan, the S-7 were ableto antrounce specific areas where
the assistance woutd focus^on including agncuqtre,-eqgy,  medical and technical assistance
as well as plans for increasing ttttti.tot  for Russiao and NIS goods' Since the IMF
would be playing the major pin io Ci*u"ti"g the $24 bgoo in assisance'  the fact that
Russia was granted firU meirUersnip  in the iUf im-tOiat"ly priol P hit attendance at a
Gi4  r*16" 
"f 
tlr t".,oit, iUustiateO once again tfiai timing could be crucial'
However, this seemingly 'finished deal' was to pFoYg -t gi*pry.tt-ent for all
involved. Russia was unable to meet the conditions that td IMF had estabtished as criteria
for the disbursement of the vast part of th assistance package' I{n* the lest 
believed that
their gove,rnmeos  were grantini l*t* 
generory 
3m- oTo;f effective assistance' in reality
the $20.g billion tbat halbeen airotrneoias had little visible effect due to the aid not beitrg
;g.r.d. AIso the system of distribution has been dessibed  as "chaotic"'
Progress Picks UP
The next step was taken by French President Francois Miterrand in mid-March 1993'
While on a visit to Moscow, he called for the G-7 to hold m emef,gency summit to discttss
ways for inprovini tn"t i.iqO of assistance to Russia. De,puty Russian Prime Minister
Boris Fydorov S":t"O what RusSia was in need of:  "For us amounts are not so
important...what is inporta:ot is tbatutional fuarciat assi$ance is well-targeted,  well-timed'
that it,s visible *  O"ip"oele feel this contribrrtion  reatly helped."'6
The following .iot, duing a neeting of G-7 btfici.ts, a consensus was built to
aftempt to iog,ror" tf,ei, assistance in time so-that it would help Yeltsin yith his 25 April
referendum. wnii. visiury against the idea, believing that aocitional assistance  would not
help the situation in Russii, ii order to avoid questiois of burden'sharing  Japan announced
on26March tbat they would host an emergeDc:tmeeting  of G-7 finance and foreign ninisters
on 14-15 APril.
Attheir 34 April summit.in Vancouver, hesideuts Clinton and Yeltsin applauded this
move and "called for accelerated G-7 developmentof substantiat  and effective new ecotronuc
initiatives  to support political and economic reform in Russia."' ln order to show the G-7
the priority the US was giving to Rurriu, President Ctinton announced a $l'6 billion US
package which il;;  "fto;, 
Unyate s€ctor srpport, concessional  food sales' sec'rity
assistance as weil as humaniurian aid. Backing up irris move, the uK predged approximalely-28-
$230 mitlion followed by Canada with $200 million'
Aside from the impressive amount in G-7 support that the Emergency summit was
abletoannounce,themeetingwasanotableeventinitself.Forthefirsttimeinitshistory'
the G_7 foreign and finance ,inirt"., came together in order to discuss one specific issue of
co,,,mon concern,o,t"i,  countries. It arso siilatteo another victory for the Ec since it was
ajso the first time n", ar,* Commission had been invited to any non-summil related talks''t
Representing ne uc in rotyo were Finance commissioner Henning christophersen and
Danish Foreigu Minister Niels-Helveg Petersen'
A Major SteP
Heralding the assistan ce packzge as "a major step forward for cooperation  between
Russia and the ma;or countries of tn. world,"t Vit. fyOot n expressed his pleasure at the
new ptedges of aid. While most newsptp"t f*$lT.ltpotttd  that the G-7 had coordinated
an economic assistance pu.trg. of t tt gioiog 913 billion in assista'nce,  the true amount of
G-7 assisran.. was the considerabry  resiuut ilr irpt*rive amount of $28-4 billion' (see
Appendix E for a UrJOo*o of n LtiSttt 
" 
pactagi). The Summil Qsmmunique described
the new aid package as being "pragmatic, ui"ibl",I-giot", and effective"a' while a senior
Ctinton AdminisUation official $ated, "We are tryinq it differently eis Us9 The idea is to
prime the pump with some initial mooey so-that G eff.cfs can be felt' and then to have mme
flexible conditions i"; G rqst.'sr a signincant proportion  of the assistance  was planned to
be avairable in 1993. Howwer,  euen tf,ough CIi pactage- had been desigued to prevent the
nistakes of the prr"r* pr.og" of assistani, raoy feared that because Russia would not be
able to meet even the reduced requiremeots tnat 
-Oi$qryment 
required' there would be a
repeat of the 1992 ;istatrce deadlock. The assistarce wilt ue dependent on Russian progr€ss
towards a uarket *oorv and poritical reform both at home and in its foreign policy.
Some individual members of the G-7 approached the meering wilh gew perspectives
toward providing rrrir,r"* to Russia. cermany, who lrd donated over half the total amount
of aid to Russia since r9g9, and curreutry is ueset bysnancial  demands in its eastern part'
w&s not able to continue with its oo*J ienerosity. Finance Mini$er Theo waigel stated,
"we have done much more than the others-. we have gone beyoud th".P*$ of our national
krterests."a Japan, who had previously  Ueeu^$gfy ug"it* grting aid to Russia due to the
northern istands dispute, predged 
" 
*rptiriog $1.g2billion. eccotding to a Japanese official,
this seemingly  new position represents ".Log" 
of nuance only, in substance the Japanese
view is unchanged. Since Russia has made pt6gror in the political area by recognizing  the
dispute over the northern islands, Japan is wiffing to make progress in the economic area by
pledging aid.B
However, as a group the G-7 were successful in putolg together.a tTIryg
assistance pacrage. us"soi"t"'y of State warren christopher focused on the advasces rn
G-7 cmPeration bY stating:
0111. detiUeratio* J"o the past trro days have been true to this mission' We
have united behind and shown concrete and srbstantial  support for reform in
Russia. The degree of unanimity among us in this effort has been
extraordinary-s
The not-tooindirect reason behind the timing and large amouut of assisance to Russia
was ro show G-7;rpe;;*nesident Yeltsin immeOiatetf before his.refereudum  on 25
April. Secreury oijt"rt Cbristopher  spoke for all G-7 members on their strategy:_29 -
Shouldtheforcesofreform-ledbyPresidentYeltsin-bethwartedwewould
face rgr.^"J- instaUitity, the lbss of large potential markets for our
businesses, and the necessity to continue to invest dollars in defense and not
in the urgeJlt domestic needi of our people's
ToPresidentYeltsintheoverwhelminglypositive.outcomeofthereferendumwhich
hes given him increased powers necessary t9 itpfut"o. t the needed reforms' most likely has
convinced him that this new assistance package has already paid-off-
The Tokyo summit - The Beginning of New Developments and Directions
As has occurred at the previous two summi6, immediately after thg upconing Tokyo
Summit, there wilI be a special G-7 + I meeting at wlicl president yertsin wil be present.
The heads of state;;;;;;;ent will discuss ways ro involve countries other than those
participating in the C-7. fn"y ru!122 that the G-7 is too 'light' a framework to carry out
effective assistance io nussia. while the general policies and criteria under which the
assistance wil be astriuuteo have arready 6foo discussed by the G-7 sherpas and rerevant
IFIs on severar occasions, the agenda wiu'inctuoe ft'ther disc'ssions on more effective ways
in which to disb'rse se assistance predged. The disbursenent of the first $l-5 billion of the
initiar support profro, through td n.; IMF qpoosored Systematic Traosformation  Facility
will most likely be announced as well'
The us will attempt to fiorewald fu 3-point plan for increasing the effectiveness  of
G_7 assistance *rr;*  k*irt  or: t) .rt uiirnrjot of a G-7 privatization tund in which
each prticipaut **fi  contribute $2 billion -tt YtU 5 
aS,additional  $2 billion each from the
world Batrk and the EBRD; 2) a denuclearization fi'od to increase the speed of destroying
nuclear weapons ;  th; NIS countri;; ;J  3) the establishment  of a Moscow-based G-7
assisance monitoring bureau'
The EC has already expressed its hesitancy over the proposed privatization  fund
stating its concerns ouo tL" uir""."-oi-tnr.  privitization support as compared to social
support. The Comm'nity nas proposeO small itest' proiects in order O determine the best
way to assist Russia. 6on".*iog ne possiuiliry;f 
-a 
G'7 monitoring office the EC,
concerned trat such an office may red'cc tre current responsibility of the IFIs in Russia,
hopes to continue to use existing forums'
While the US and EC fo3vg seemingly different ap'proaches, s h the G'24 assisBnce
package, they are io A"t slight and pose o6 t3ot obstaiies that cannot be solved d'ring the
G-7 + 1 meeting.
That this new G-7 assistance package holds the potential to be higlrly effective is due
to the G-7 realizilg G ionoro, fautts ofihe previous assisance to Russia and working to
ove,rcome them. ii"  rogi. behind ttt" c,rrrent p".t"gr is that in order for assistance to have
positive resrlts it *rtt 6 visible and targeted- rn" tt"puy-tbP.a-gprolh.will  allow aid to
be disbursed as economic reforrns are fJthcoming. The $a.1 billion in the initial supPort
pckage ror sauili"ation, unlike previous assistanc{ will have no strict conditionality attached
to it therefore allowing Rlssia to receive this criticat initial assistance withitr the next 3{
months. The gradnr-disbursement;ll aho prevent the distribution system in Rusia to
avoid a possible overload-
Russia also has taken st€ps to improve the effectiveness of the assistance it receives'
Rearizing that his country,s sy$em or &stribution  was unabre to effectively deal with tle-30-
large amounts of assistauce,  President Yettsin established the Russian Agency for
International  cooperation (RAIcpl in trre ratter half of 1992. Desigped  to better manage and
coordinate the many different types of assistance,  it is meant to act as a 'go-betw@n'  for the
donors and recipieno. in. Ec,^nrougt-is  N"rio"al coordinating  unit, and the world Bank
have already become involved in the RAICD' 
.o.r c.nmrr in fn'r
According to a world Bank report, RAICD will need support in four marn areas m
order to carry out ib objectives: l) expert advice on the types of projects and their scope that
should be implemented; 2) improved coordinatioo between  the Russian govenrment  and the
donors; 3) information on the manner inwhich assistance is uzualry grven (i.e-, procurement,
payments,*o...ouotiogproceduresxand4)adviceonprocedurestoattractandmanage
foreign invesfinent-r
Experienced gained from previous assisance has permitted  the G-7 and relevant IFIs
to esrablish ,"u*"r it  which o,"r, u" lo"ur.o on in oider to improve the effectiveoess of
assistance.rheworrdgatrkhasdefinedtheseareasinpartasfollows:
l.  Establish PrioritY areas
2. Assist nussia in designing an agenda-for lnre 
reform
3.. pre,pare lyrt"."ti. Oia fol beuer information on the Russian economy
4. Train Uetter prepared Russian agency officials
5- Increase the role of regional governments
6. Support the developt*,gia"Russian consulting  field through increased
utitiltion and training of local professionals 
-L - D---. '
7. tncrease coordination and interaction between  donors and the Russran
governnent, focusing on RAICD'fl
By continuing to search f-  ;tlJf  furproving the manner in which assistance  is
disbursed as welt as insreasing their cdrdinatioo bet*."o themselves and the recipients, the
G_7 baveproven trrr^"t"", a-valid forum for coordinating  the zupportof developing regions'
The Tokyo summit wilt prwide u-ur"ful oppornrnity roi nign-tevel face'to'facr  discussion
of the next steps oat need to be taken. tnl'fact that president Yeltsin will dso be present
wiu add a cruciar erement to the meeting by representing the view of the recipient among
those of the donors.
The Repercussions  of Assistance to the G-7
while it is still too early to determine the resutts of the new G-? assistance package
to Russia, implications for the funrre of G-7 cooperation  and coordination involving assistance
may arready be seen. Both the G-T assistance io Russia as well as the G-7 imptemented but
G-24 coordinated assistance to the CEEC have been seen as long-term commitments  to these
areas. While having no way near the amount of determining fuflu"no thl,was connected
with the Marshan plan, the continued invorvement of the G-7 will necessarily give them at
least a minimum amount of influence in the direction tbat these countries develop'
Future countries requiring support may apProTh the G-7 for similar assistance
packages  as have U""o giu"n to nitti"ioO  Ure iggd- Regions zuch as -M"it9 -19:51
America which exert influence on the policies of.th9 
-US ^ 
well as the developing  countnes
in sE Asia with regard to Japan ,n"y i"qu"s their 'share' of G-7 atteotion. If this were to
happen, the G-7 #il;J.to  bothbrioritize is agarda as well as o delegate the orperation
rf"riit -* 
packages to new or exrsting forums *qth focus on assistance'
The level of success of their l-a1,]1 pledge to Russia will det€rnine whether they can
be credible in n. ilng-t"r* r*tp"*iuilitio asJociateo with assistatrce packages' However'-3r -
the G-7 witl need to redefrtne iS role in international affairs' The Group will need to realize
that its main priorities must continue to be the coordination of economic  and monetary
policies.
Criticsandsupportersalikerq|izethatthefutureoftheG-Twillinvolverevisionto
its structue. The *oito that exiss today is dramati_cally  different from that which existed
at the time of ne nrst summit and wil rikely be different again in thg near future- As has
been seen, the G-7 have attempted to adapt to changing times wrth .vaving 
degrees of
success. while the S-7 zummits have continued their progression  into g.hg public affuirs
events, the G-7 pfocess of cooperation  and coordination in economic and political areas has
overall proven to be useful. However, each can be said to have its advantages and
disadvantages.
Proposed changes in the format of the G-7 include the extremes of intensifying the
Group by forming -  Iottinttionalized intergovernmental structure and that of dissolving the
Cr1. A senior associate at the Carnegie ddowment for lnternational Peace' Professor G'
John lkenberry pr"rlnt"o his plan for-'sarvaging the G-7' in the latest edition of Foreign
Affairs. He proposed a three-polnt  structurtviiiuty based on that of the EC. These re:
l) a Secretariat - ;;itd"g  or pouSv specialists to-:"yt information and analysis needs as
well as to encoura;;;;;tt  .ontinuout set of policies; 2) A G'7 Cormcil. - membenhip
would include the heads of sate or govemment oi th. G-7 as well a-s the foreigp and frnance
ministers. However, unlike the dC Council, this body would have no decision-making
powefs. A primary aim of this council woutd be the creation of an Attantic-Pacific  chart€r
whic-h would serve a similar function as the current bilaieral declarations that exist beween
the participatrts of the G-7; and 3) a private sector consultative group - modelled after the
Ecouomic and social commicee. Ikenberry believes this substantial revision in tb€ G-7 is
crucial in order to take advantage or oe 
"pbo*oity 
that exists "to create a kind of liberal
great power ,concert, in which c-z countries organize to coordinate collective responses --.
[so that theyl may finalty undertake t pt**  o|-suUstaigve policy coordination'  not merely
to shepherd trre grouar6onomy but aiso to devise a stable political order for the post-cold-
War world."s
At the other extreme is the idea of dissolving the G-7 and bringing a halt to the
zummits. However, ;;"  itt most virulent critics 
"O.it 
tbat this move would be detrimental
to the conce,pt of international  cooperation. The S-7 has at least a few redeeming qualities'
the least of which is that the summits force the G-7 leaders to become knowledgeable  in
financial and monetarY issues.
The most fiili  fut"" scenario is somewhere in benpeen  these nro exEemes, thougb
it seerns to be closer to the institutionalizing  of its stnrchre than in its dissolution' The first
harf of this year G witnessed calls for a"deepening of the G-7 cooperation process from
many familiar with the current syst€m'
T\e 
,de 
facto, ro|eof the. EC in the G-7 will need to be changed in the future. The
Maastricht Treaties, which cooltin the legislation necessary for economic  and political
deepening of the community,  as 
-well 
as the current steps \ing .ttryi to widen the
Community nrough tle;"*t;fu of states, will necessarily strength.gn t{ e!' The increase
in the current oooori. power that the EC already possesses will make it an ever more
formidabre parher in the 6-z requirin g a'de iure' ryritign. 
serious discussion of this mafier
should begrn soon in order to teee"pace *io irtr advances being made in uniting the-32-
Communiry  and all of EuroPe.
There has atso ueen a suggestion to further enlarge the G-7 by including Russia' I'ate
in March Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, proposed that.Russia  become a full
member of the G-7 as pirt of a 5-7 year ptogfutn of cooperation in the areas of economics
and technology.'  Wt ii. a cooperatibo p-dtn Tuy^ry 
beneficial, full membership would
pose a difficurt situation since the oo'n ?o.ir of the G-7 is coordination  and cooperation of
financial ano monetary pti.ies of which Russia has not frrlly shown its support for'
rn" up.o*ing io(o  summit provides the S-7, and the G-7 as a whole, the
opportunity to def,rne-its futue. The items on the agenda, including the Russian economic
assistnnce pactage,- tle Un preliminary- market ltt:s  agreement' and the possible
coordination.of growth packages,  are equally important in securing a pfosperous and stable
world. The powerfuf ani innuential particip,i"U  61nis group must transform their individual
assets into an effective united force for a better funre'
Asscssing the Group of Seven
An assessment of the G-7 must first differentiate  between the S-7 and the G-7
cooperation  process. The summits, while being an "action-forcing process"m, and bringing
the leaders closer to each other as well as to tne citizens of the G-7 countries, must be judged
in a rather poor light. Tbeir record of producing  bland declarations  that repeatedly  encourage
grandiose actions only to allow them to be forg-otten until the next zummit has brought about
the necessity for this negative assessment. The members of the s-7 must take the initiative
!o become more involuj io the summis and the G-7 process. As one report stated: "They
are, after all, the leaders of the classiest club of all time, a club that bas " ' brought
unprecedented prosperity to its mcmbers'"et
The assessment  of the G-7 process of cooperation and coordination in the spheres of
economic and poriticar issues is significantry moie positive. As this surdy has attempted to
illustrate, while there is still ample room for imprwement, especially in the area of trade-
related cooperation, the G-7 process has proven its usefulness.
Although a detailed future G-7 aginda is not yet evident and may still allow unique
oppornrnitio to U" passed by, US Treasuty S.o"t".y Bentsen recently d"ttTbed the current
G-7 agenda: "G,' agenda is no longer CominateO  by nuclear security and the balance of
power; it is one of Jconomic cooperation  and partnership that advances global peace and
prosperity.'n The rlanner in which the G-7 address the points on today's agenda will define
the agenda of the funre--33 -
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APPENDTX A
SUMMIT CHRONOI,OGY 1975 - 1992
Date
Novcmbcr 15-17, 1975
Iuas77-2t, 1976
Mry 73,l9Tl
luty lGt?, t97t
tue2l-29,19'19
turc Zl-Zl, 1980
luly 2G21, l9tl
I-ocation
Rrmbouillct
hrcrto Rico
Loadoo
Boon
Tokyo
Vcoicc
Our*r
Declered Objectives and Actions
Ovcrconrc  higtr urrmploymcnr, inflrtion, rnd cncrgy
poblcmr
-Morrtrry  uodcaerding  to inLrycnc  io mrr&ar in crrc of
arddca 0ucultioru ia crchrngc nrcr
-Achisvc ncrdy cxpeoioo,  rcducc urrcployarng  coaplctc
Tokyo Rorrd of GATT by cnd of 1977
-Agrc€  to woid crccrivc  nimuhtioo  of individurl  ccomnricr
€rcra jobr, redrrc iothti<m,  nrrke p!o8Tcr. tornrdr
cooplaioo  of  Tokyo R.ound, rcck coogcntioo with
irlcrortioorl  inriortioot  (IMF, World knt,  G.d, urd
oEcD)
€ommit to rpccific  Srovth trrgcu
4rcrtc uue jobe, figtt ia0etiott, ta limirt for imporrod oil
ia rhc EC lod US, crrblirb ticr-trblc  foc thc cooplaln of
thc Tokyo Rornd by [lcccnrbcr 1978
-Agr€ to trkc edForic ecion u  rcquircd (.c-, US ro
rcducc iollrtioo, ,ep.r ro iocrcrrc doorcab  &nuod)' j<irt
rcrolutioo coadcmniog  incrnrtionrl  tcrrorirm
-Nac urycrcy to  rcducc oil  consrcpti<n td  Wd
dcvclopnrc of rlternrtive rourccr of  ccrAy, id.ndry
iodiviturl cconomic  policler to  rcrcb bdlmc runng
prrricipentr
&t  qurnificd inporr lsveb for oil up to l9t5
-Top prirxiry of rcdtrcing in0etion, c*oungc iavclard rrd
'mmvrtioo
-EdrbliA Etsr.rG3 to rcducc oil consrqrtioo" politicrl
dcchntioo  c.odcadrlt Sovia invrrirn of Afgb.oir.o ud
iacrortbod  bonrgc<rtiag,  cndorrc corrluri<n  of To&yo
Round
-Nccd for ccorpmic liorilur, rcduaion of iolbtio rnd
uea1ploylarrc hfuhcapriorithr,  mininiz. Oucoltln  ia
erchra3c trlcr, crcdntp  3cP3 to Prcrcrvc rtc dir@d
-No roej<r policy rctbor rerc umlrcd'  opiniooccctaiog
E r-wcr  rndc ehrkror (.c., Soicr PiFlirr irr)  ru
dividcd
-lmrerrc ir ccommie grorvth,  tcducc urclploym$  hevc
divcnificd bstcruticu  rpprorchto FW indc, trxrrcto'rrdr
r mre ordcrly idrmdonrt moocu.y rylcm ia *ticb IMF
6onld phy e mrj<r rdc
-Mooarry  rccord rgnccd upoa
Iune 4{, l9t2 Vcrrrillertlo
APPENDTX A, continued
Declared Objectives and Actions
-Meintrin lorr infutioo,  rcducc urcmployffint, int rcst rrcr,
rrd budgct dcficitr
-strtcrrcar  oo dcfcnrc rtd rrmr reduction. crll for lrms
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€onkol  morrctrry growrh, rcducc intcrcg rrtcs rnd inflrtion,
puerc iocrcrrcd  cooPcntioo with thc USSR
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caudricr, potiticrl dcchntioo  on 40th erurivcrsrry  of cod of
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-Long-{crm  tgprorcho economic growth ir errcourrgcA'$tA
foc coainucd irprwcnpnr ia gtowrh rrd  fighting of
in0rtioo, coarol  public pcnding
-Formrtion  of G-7 Fiocc Minidrtr STouP to met bctwccn
G-? erauniu, incrclcd coopcntionsith thc IMF in otdcr to
rtrcagthcn nrrltihtcnl srrvcilhrrc
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nu,rhihtcnl  tnotrc{rry erwcillerrcc
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ectiviticr,  politicrl dcchntioo  in opport of reform  io Polend
eod Huogrry ud rcquca Comrnistion of thc EC ro cotdirutc
rir! to thcr couaricr
Date
Mey 28-30,  1983
Iurr 7-9, l9E4
Mey 2'1, 1985
Mey 46, l9t6
lurr &10, l9t7
Jurr 19-21, l9tt
luty tCl6, 1989
Location
Williemsburg,  U.S.A.
Loodon
Tokyo
Vcnicc
Tomnto
Prri.H{
July l5-17, l99l lordon
July 6-t, 1992
Sources: Declarations of Western Economic
Bayne, Nicholas. 'Hanging Together: The
Press, Cambridge. 1984.
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Declared Objectives and Actions
_&Lraccd  8losth, reducc &6cirr, cncoungc irwcstrn€nq strt€
rrccd ro lowcr rgticultrnl nrbridicr,  rcquit€.rcot  of conunon
indicrton to  cxrmie  ccorpmic  3ro{/th, comrncnd
Commirriooof  6c EC for coordirutiooof  G_24 urigrncc  io
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-Wott torndt ooaplcri<r of thc Urugury Rouad by cnd of
lgyL ircrlz,d polidc.l  dccbnri<nr  on cqraricr of Ccrlnl
rod Euem Europc ud tbc fornpr yugorhvh
Date
Iuly 9-ll, 1990
Location
Houston
Summits 1975-1992, and
Seven-Power Summits.'
Puham, Robert D.,
Harvard Univenity47
APPET.IDf,K  B
GI,OBAL PARTNERS IN TRADE: A COMPARISON
Shares in World Trade - Exports
1991 Figures in US$ billion
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SELECTED FTONOI\{IC INDICATORS
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Name
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APPENDIX D, continued
Current
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